Tamil Eelam is dead. She died 17 May 2009, in a corpse-littered patch of jungle and beach barely the size of New York’s Central Park, amid a torrent of Sinhalese shells, the curses of warriors who had run out of ammunition and the screams of wounded for whom there were neither doctors nor medicine. Some died fighting. Some took poison. Some tried to escape and were shot fleeing. The rest, some 300,000, were herded into concentration camps. The father of Tamil Eelam died with his creation. Tamil Eelam will not be reborn, if ever, for at least a generation.
Truth be told, the death agony of a nation is a slow and painful thing. Though the leaders of Tamil Elam finally admitted last Sunday that the struggle had come to its bitter end, this end had become all but inevitable long before. We need not fix the 17-th of May 2009 as the day of the death of Tamil Elam. We can just as easily say that Tamil Eelam died in January of 2007, when the Sinhalese army, now overwhelmingly superior to the army of Tamil Eelam both in numbers and in weaponry, launched a decisive campaign of conquest in the East of Ceylon. We can also say that Tamil Eelam died on 2 January 2009 when Kilinochchi, the capital of Tamil Eelam, fell to Sinhalese troops. We can even say that Tamil Eelam died on 24 March 1990, though this assertion would produce among many of her partisans a veritable explosion of outrage and disbelief. But first things first.
Tamil Elam was born in the nineteen fifties, when the Sinhalese majority in newly-independent Sri Lanka set about to build a national identity by appealing to Sinhalese nationalism. By an act of the Sinhalese-dominated parliament, a million Tamils were stripped of citizenship and franchise on the grounds that their parents or grandparents had been born in India. The proportion of Tamil voters in the electorate instantly dropped from 33% to 20%, giving the Sinhalese a lock on the 2/3 parliamentary majority needed to pass any law they wanted. Sinhalese became the official language of Sri Lanka. Tamil civil servants, who had dominated the English colonial administration, were summarily fired. Under the guise of agricultural schemes, the Sinhalese government pushed Tamils off their land, flooding newly-created enlarged tracts of farmland with previously landless Sinhalese. Pogroms and general oppression ensued. In the 1958 riots alone, 25,000 Tamils were forced to flee into the northern part of the island. An effort was even made to deport “stateless” disenfranchised Tamils to India. The Tamil response to this campaign was predictable and obvious.
At first, they followed the non-violent path of Mohandas Gandhi. Old men sat at the entrances of government offices, chanting hymns and preventing government clerks from entering by blocking the entrances with their bodies. The Sinhalese police beat them aside with clubs. Peaceful protests were dispersed by Sinhalese thugs acting with semi-official sanction. The peaceful way of satyagraha was of no avail. Gandhi’s approach had worked with the British because the refined British public and media would take their government to task over the perceived violations of Indian civil rights. It would not work against the Sinhalese because the Sinhalese public and media eagerly applauded the violation of Tamil civil rights.
By the nineteen seventies, the Tamil language was banned and Tamil contacts with the Tamil population of India were forcibly cut off. A policy of deliberate discrimination in everything from housing and employment to university scholarships pushed the Tamils to the fringes of society and sat the Sinhalese firmly on top. Sinhalese troops patrolled Tamil villages, assaulting anyone who dared to look at them the wrong way. A deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing was pushing Tamils deeper and deeper into the north of Ceylon. There was no doubt in the mind of any sane observer that the Sinhalese would not stop until they slowly, by stages, pushed the Tamils into the ocean. In fact, the Sinhalese said as much. Tamils, according to the Sinhalese, were foreigners who belonged in India.
When Tamil youth demanded action in the face of government oppression, their elders quelled them in the name of “national unity” and “non-violence”. They were told that Hinduism prohibited violence. They were told that parliamentary means could ensure their rights. They were told that this Tamil politician or that Tamil politician or some other Tamil politician would somehow magically make an agreement with the Sinhalese in exchange for his vote in one coalition or another.
The agreements were duly made. And duly broken. The oppression continued. In the end, the youth did the only rational thing they could have done. They rejected their elders. They rejected the Sinhalese State. They rejected non-violence. They demanded a country of their own. At gunpoint.
It was the seventies. The West seemed on the run, the Soviets were winning the Cold War and Marxist rebels were popping up the world over. For a young man rebelling against the established order and the religion of his elders, Marxism was the logical way to go. Therefore it is not surprising, though unfortunate for the Tamil people on Ceylon, that those who sought to liberate them from Sinhalese rule were mostly Marxists. In May 1976, a glorified street gang of brutal thugs who overlaid savagery with Marxist rhetoric adopted the grandiose name “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”. Their leader, a twenty-one-year-old high school dropout named Vellupilai Prabhakaran, had already set the tone in July of the previous year by shooting the mayor of Jaffna as the latter arrived to pray at a Hindu temple.
Things spiraled on from there and, as generally happens in conflicts of this type, all pretense of civilization was rapidly thrown aside. The point of no return came in July of 1983, when, allegedly in response to an LTTE ambush that killed 15 Sri Lankan soldiers, Sinhalese civilians rioted across the island, murdering some 3,000 Tamils. The rioters had official government voter lists showing the names and addresses of Tamils. The Sinhalese army and police stood by and did nothing for days as entire neighborhoods were burned to the ground. As Tamil motorists were pulled out of their cars and burned alive at improvised checkpoints, whole families were hacked to pieces in their living rooms and Tamil temples were put to the torch by Sinhalese mobs led by plainclothes police, spontaneity , unlike brutality, was not in evidence. The event would forever be remembered by the Tamils as Black July.
In response to this final atrocity, hundreds of thousands of Tamils fled abroad, while those remaining on Ceylon made their way to the North and East of the island, where the heretofore small-time pro-independence insurgency suddenly had no shortage of recruits. Asia’s longest running civil war was on in earnest, no holds barred.
In the resultant competition of savagery and atrocity, the Tigers took first place. They massacred civilians. They used child soldiers. They invented the suicide belt and, at least before al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, they held the record as the world’s most prolific suicide bombers. They murdered politicians, both Sinhalese and Tamil. They killed a president of Sri Lanka and even a former Indian Prime Minister. They killed any Tamil who refused to join them, slaughtering all their opponents except for those who chose to seek the protection of the Sinhalese government in Colombo and thereby renounce the idea of an independent Tamil State on Ceylon. They got themselves proscribed by 32 countries across the globe as a terrorist organization. But they built their state.
Say what you will about Vellupilai Prabhakaran, and there is much to be said, but he genuinely believed in the cause he espoused. He may have been a murderous gangster, but he was a TAMIL murderous gangster and he loved his people and his country. The problem was that he loved himself more. The other problem was that his education and background prevented him from successfully managing the liberation of his people, yet his incredible charisma, ruthlessness and natural talent inexorably thrust him to the top of the Tamil hierarchy and concentrated total power in his hands.
Initially, the Tamils managed to achieve some success. Surprise and terrain were on their side. But the tide quickly began to turn. In 1987, with the Tamil insurgency on the verge of annihilation, India intervened to rescue the Tamils of Ceylon. Of course, the Indians did not do this out of the goodness of their hearts. The cause of Tamil Eelam was, unsurprisingly, popular in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, an area the size of Greece and home to tens of millions of Tamils. Rajiv Gandhi needed the votes and the political fixers from the South. While India rattled her saber, a completely unrelated Sinhalese Marxist insurgency broke out in Southern Ceylon. The Sinhalese government in Colombo could only fight so many enemies at a time. An agreement was duly signed between Colombo and New Delhi providing for an end to fighting in the North of Ceylon and for an Indian peacekeeping force. The Tamil insurgents were to lay down their arms.
The Tamils had their State, in fact if not in name. Now they needed to create the economic and military infrastructure necessary for self-sufficiency. This had to be done under the noses of the Indians, while the latter looked the other way or failed to notice developments out of simple complacency.
But this did not happen. When the accord was signed, Prabhakaran was receiving military aid from India. But no one had consulted him on the accord itself. His people were excluded from the de-facto Tamil government, styled as the ”Provincial Council” of the newly administratively united Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Instead of biding his time, keeping his mouth shut, making a pretense of disarming and establishing defensive industries and an economic base while the Indian peacekeepers drank tea in their camps , flirted with local girls and shopped in the marketplaces, Prabhakaran loudly protested the Indian intervention.
What Tamil Eelam needed was a decade or two of Indian protection while it developed the wherewithal to defend itself. But the leader of the Tigers would not, could not see it. He was a street thug in his early thirties with not even ten grades of education. In his world, appearance was everything and patience was not a known virtue. He wanted a State in NAME, not realizing that in order to have one it is first necessary to build a State in FACT. Worse, he did not limit himself to protests. In short order, partly due to Sinhalese manipulation of events and partly due to the arrogance of their leader, the Tigers were fighting the Indian army. The Tigers were brave, skillful and resourceful fighters. They made a good showing in the initial battle in Jaffna, retreated to the jungles and fought the Indians to a standstill. And in so doing, they destroyed Tamil Eelam.
The Sinhalese happily armed the Tigers while this conflict went on. Unlike the leader of the Tigers, the leaders of Sri Lanka understood perfectly that they themselves had nary a prayer of shifting the Indians out of the North. The Indians had a million men under arms even without resorting to conscription. Given provocation enough, they would have been in Colombo within a year, if not sooner. Despite the fire-breathing demands Sri Lanka’s newly elected prime minister made to his generals, the idea of the Sri Lankan army shooting at the army of India was ludicrous on the face of it. The Sri Lankan generals told their new civilian leader as much, in blunt terms. And while India’s army stayed in the North as “peacekeepers”, the Tamils had free reign. But an anti-Indian insurgency among the very people India was supposed to be protecting would get the Indians out in short order as the Indian public soured on Rajiv Gandhi’s personal foreign adventure.
Indeed, this is exactly what happened. In 1989, Rajiv Gandhi lost the Indian elections. By this point, the ongoing bloody fiasco in Sri Lanka had cost India 1100 soldiers and 20 billion rupee in taxpayer money. The new government began to withdraw troops. On 24 March 1990, the last Indian soldier left Ceylon.
The Tigers did not realize at this point that they were already defeated. Indeed, a rapid effort to reconcile with India could have still saved Tamil Eelam. But it was not to be.
Over the 32 months of Indian presence in Sri Lanka, the LTTE established the beginnings of what would become the most remarkable fundraising organization in the history of guerrilla warfare. In due course, they would arguably become the world’s most successful self-financed Mao-style guerilla movement. With receipts from legitimate cover businesses, drug smuggling, criminal financial schemes in Europe and North America, contributions from the Tamil diaspora and funds paid by Moslem terrorists in exchange for training, the Tigers would eventually take in as much as $200,000,000 to $300,000,000 a year. Over the next ten years or so, the Tigers seemed to hold their own. The battle ebbed and flowed across northern Ceylon and intermittent cease-fires seemed to ultimately favor the Tigers. By 2000, with a European-sponsored peace process underway, the Tigers controlled over 15,000 square kilometers in the North and East of the island. But beneath the surface, things were not going well at all.
Built upon Marxist gangsterism, the rule of the Tigers proved to be corrupt and oppressive. With constant war sweeping back and forth across the country, no serious industries or even large-scale agricultural enterprises could ever be established by private entrepreneurs and the Tigers themselves failed to establish any kind of serious defense industry. Educated Tamils left for India or the West. The Tigers had no way to retain them by providing them with good jobs at home, nor did they make any real effort to replace them. Instead, the Tigers demanded bribes in exchange for permission to emigrate. The funds not spent to make life more comfortable for the Tiger upper echelon were spent to buy foreign-made arms on the international black market.
Over time, the structural weaknesses built up. Tamil Eelam smuggled drugs but did not grow them in quantity. Tamil Eelam bought arms but did not make them on any noticeable scale. While the economy of Sri Lanka grew, the economy of Tamil Eelam did not. Two or three hundred million a year are enough to run a killer insurgency, but it is no income for a State in need of defense from an aggressive neighbor. Yet it never seemed to occur to the leaders of the LTTE that while an AK might cost $500 on the black market, the materials to make one can be had openly for a tenth that price, if one first takes the trouble to buy the necessary machinery and to train the relevant workforce. While a laser-guided antitank missile or a heat-seeking MANPAD will set you back a good thirty or forty grand, the materials to make one could be had for a few thousand dollars. But first you have to have the engineers to design it and the skilled workers to put it together, not to mention the machinery to do so.
But on the other hand, with the Sinhalese air force bombing them every other week, how and where could the Tigers have established a serious arms industry, even if they had wanted to? If they had made peace with India, they could have done so quietly in Tamil Nadu. But instead of acting rationally they sent a suicide bomber to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi in revenge for the 5,000 Ceylonese Tamils killed by India’s army while Gandhi was prime minister.
A lack of war industry was not the only problem Tamil Eelam had not solved. Far worse was the demographic problem. Driven by the Marxist ideology of male-female equivalence and the imperative of necessity, the Tigers established all-female full-time units to supplement their forces as early as 1984. Instead of disbanding these units as soon as possible in order to free the women for the all-important duty of childbearing, the Tigers institutionalized full-time female service in the army. As direct result, 4000 women, the vast majority of them of prime child-bearing age, would die fighting for the Tigers. Thousands more would forgo, delay or curtail childbearing in order to pursue a military career. For a minority that started out critically short of fighters to begin with, this policy amounted to institutionalized national suicide. If every one of the 4,000 women who died in battle for Tamil Eelam had instead died in childbirth on her fifth pregnancy, Tamil Eelam would have had a whole additional division in the final confrontation of 2008-2009. But, in all fairness, after the Indian peacekeepers had left, Tamil Eelam had no choice but to mobilize her women.
And so while the Sinhalese population was getting larger, the Tamil population was all but stagnating. Worse still was the proportion of young men of military age. In 1985, some 22% of Ceylonese Tamil men were aged 15-24. By 2003, this metric had declined to below 17%, passing below the Sinhalese youth percentage and trending downward as if it had fallen off a cliff. In the meantime, the percentage of Sinhalese males in this critical age bracket had bottomed out at 17% around 2000 and was now trending moderately upward. The Sinhalese had let their boys grow up and marry instead of drafting them into the army at 10 or 14. They had left their women at home to make babies instead of using them as cannon fodder. Their power was growing, while the power of Tamil Eelam, for all the incredible bravery, skill, ruthlessness and inhuman brutality of the Tigers, was waning. In his seminal book “The Clash of Civilizations”, Samuel Huntington used the demographics of the two populations to predict defeat for the Tamils and an end to the conflict sometime early in the first quarter of the 21-st century. He was spot on. Beneath the facade, Tamil Eelam was crumbling.
Yet the leadership of Tamil Eelam remained oblivious. Impressed by the news coverage and shock that its spectacular terror attacks produced, the LTTE broke cease-fire after cease-fire. And even when they won the battles, they were losing the war bit by imperceptible bit. The conflict had to be ended, and ended immediately, or Tamil Eelam would die.
In September 2001, the world changed for the Tigers. Their past associations with Moslem terrorists from the PFLP to al-Qaeda were now a major liability. Western governments began to place the LTTE on the official terrorist list, freezing the Tigers’ assets wherever these could be found. Western intelligence agencies worked full time to cut off LTTE funding. Ultimately all these efforts could be defeated, but in the meantime they produced a substantial temporary disruption in fundraising. With no domestic economy to speak of, Tamil Eelam had nothing to fall back on to weather the storm.
Simultaneously, the Sinhalese obtained increased aid from abroad. The Japanese wanted to further their business interests on the island. The Chinese wanted not only business but, in the long term, an unsinkable aircraft carrier off the Indian coast. The Americans and Europeans wanted to shut down the Tigers in order to close down a major source of false documents and terrorist expertise that had repeatedly been used by well-heeled Islamic terrorists. Who was right and who was wrong in the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese did not interest these parties in the least. What mattered to them was who was strong and who was weak, who would do business with them and who would not, who could guarantee order and stability and who couldn’t make such a guarantee. With a flood of Japanese money and Chinese guns, the capabilities of Sri Lanka’s army increased dramatically. American Special Forces were brought in to train Sinhalese units. The Sinhalese now had Kfirs, Mig-27s, Mi-24s, Super Dvora gunboats, a small fleet of Israeli UAVs, heavy artillery, Grad MRLs and a full suite of heavy, medium and light armor. Their military engineering corps had been tasked with building a defense industry and was now producing its own wheeled APCs.
Against all this, the Tamils were still relying primarily on determined riflemen and RPG gunners supported by mortars and a few cannon. They did manage to acquire a few T-55 tanks and BMP-1s, but the level of maintenance they could provide for these aging vehicles could only be characterized as appalling. Nor did they have the wherewithal to properly train the crews.
The sole achievement the Tigers could boast in the 2000s was the formation of an air force. But with R44s, Cessna Skymasters and a few ultralights being its only aircraft, this air force was merely a militarily insignificant annoyance to the Sinhalese. The Tamil navy still relied on sampans with machine guns and suicide speedboats packed with explosives. Nigh-on twenty years after independence, Tamil Eelam could not even provide all of its warriors with tiger-striped fatigues.
By 2004, the writing was on the wall for all but the completely blind. Prabhakaran’s right-hand man in the East, Colonel Karuna, broke ranks with the LTTE, leading 5,000 men over to the Sinhalese side and providing critical intelligence to the Sinhalese army. By July 2007, with Colonel Karuna’s help, the Sinhalese had conquered the entire Eastern half of Tamil Eelam. The attention of the Sri Lankan government now turned to the North. The Tigers fought with their usual skill and ruthlessness, but to no avail. Position after position fell to the Sinhalese. After a fierce defense, Kilinochchi fell on 2 January 2009. On 25 January, the last major town in Tamil Eelam, Mullativu, was captured by the Sri Lankan Army.
As usual with a dying state, the rulers of Tamil Eelam became more despotic and ruthless as the situation grew more desperate. Tiger units began to forcibly conscript any able-bodied Tamil male they could find. But with a critical shortage of weapons and ammunition, this policy was of no use whatsoever. Everything was running out. There was no more food, no more clean water, no more medicine, barely any shelter from the constant artillery barrages and air strikes. Soon, Tigers were firing on Tamil civilians in an effort to prevent the latter from going toward Sinhalese lines to surrender. With Sinhalese shells raining indiscriminately down on the supposed “no fire zone” where the surviving Tigers tried to hide behind their own civilians in the hope that the West would intervene and save them, the last remaining piece of Tamil Eelam, an ever-shrinking strip of beach and jungle littered with thousands of unburied corpses, began to resemble a scene from Dante’s Inferno.
The West did not care about Tamil civilians. On 16 May, organized resistance ceased. Vellupilai Prabhakaran was killed on 18 May, along with his eldest son and his closest compatriots. He had smuggled his wife and younger children off the island years before. Though he could have joined them and spent the remainder of his life in anonymity, supported by his personal wealth and connections, he chose to stay and die with his country. He fought to the bitter end.
Even according to official statistics, the final confrontation of 2008-2009 had cost Sri Lanka 3200 dead and over 30,000 wounded. Despite their enormous inferiority in manpower, machines and materiel, the Tigers had fought magnificently. For example, though they matched sampans and speedboats against ultra-modern gunboats, the Sea Tigers sank between one third and half of Sri Lanka’s coastal craft. But, in the end, they lost. Will, skill and heroism can only go so far against overwhelming material superiority.
The situation we face today is not at all unlike the situation faced by the Tamils on Ceylon in the 1970s. The dati leumi are a small minority within the alien chiloni State of Israel. The Israeli government is waging a relentless war against the Jewish national identity. While Israeli police beat Jewish children with clubs and demolish Jewish homes, the so-called leaders of the dati leumi community keep promising that Feiglin or Katz or some other politician will make a deal with the chilonim that will ensure civil rights for Jews via the democratic parliamentary process. In the meantime, those youth whose healthy instincts tell them to resist Israeli oppression with violence are told that this is madness, that national unity must be placed above all things, that the State of Israel is holy and that violent self-defense against the Israelis is a violation of Judaism.
Somewhere among the Jews of Yosh there is, right now, a Jewish Vellupilai Prabhakaran. Call him Anonymous Avi. Today he is twelve or maybe fourteen, with shaggy unkempt hair poking out from beneath his giant kippah, his face framed by oversized payot, his tallit katan worn on the outside of his shirt in a struggle to assert his separate, Jewish, non-Israeli identity.
He curses too much and davens too little. He doesn’t do well in school and he doesn’t care. Maybe he smokes. Maybe he drinks. It makes him feel better and it annoys his parents, so he does it sometimes solely do tick them off. He doesn’t want to listen to his elders because everything he has ever heard from them on the most important Jewish issue of the day, the survival of the Jewish People in the Holy Land, is ludicrous mamlachti nonsense. Perhaps he has already had his home demolished, possibly more than once. Perhaps he has seen his sister beaten to a pulp by Israeli thugs at Amona or at Beit HaShalom. Perhaps he has been beaten to a pulp himself.
He is smart, willful, cunning, charismatic, talented. He is a born leader. His friends, hilltop youth not very different from himself, stand with him against a hostile, uncomprehending, screwed-up world. His heart burns with undying hatred for the Israeli State that has oppressed him all his life. If he had a gun, he would shoot yassamniks. If he had a bomb, he would blow them up. He has no gun. But he plots to get one. He has no bomb. But he will learn English just so he can use the internet to find out how to build one.
In his mind, he sees the Arabs and the Israeli soldiers who help them ripped apart by Jewish bombs, screaming and writhing in bloody agony. In his mind, he sees his enemies crumbling, struck by bullets from his gun. In his mind, he leads an army of young men and women just like himself to glorious victory over the Israeli enemy.
He knows that one day very soon, he and his few close friends will take control. He knows that the time is coming when he will be able to strike back without mercy against all those who have oppressed his people. And he is absolutely right.
If things are permitted to go on the way they have been going, he, this Anonymous Avi whom you have probably met half a dozen times at a melave malkah in your own yishuv, will take control. He will launch himself at the Israeli occupier and the occupier’s Arab allies in a fury of youthful energy and rage. He will slaughter his enemies without mercy. He will hunt down the traitors and hypocrites who have sold out the Jewish People in exchange for Israeli handouts. He will build an army of other Avis, Yossis and Shlomos just like himself. He will throw the Israeli occupiers out of Medinat Yehudah. And he will destroy our country even as he tries to liberate it.
He, this Anonymous Avi, must not be allowed to take control, for we face the most technically difficult national liberation struggle in history. This is a struggle for which our anonymous hilltop youth is singularly unprepared. He does not have the education, the patience, the humility to wage it to victory. But he has the charisma, the intelligence, the talent and the rage to wage it to bloody and heroic defeat.
Unlike ourselves, dear reader, our anonymous hilltop youth does not understand that a State in FACT must precede a State in NAME. He does not understand that we cannot simply throw the Israelis out of our country overnight in an orgy of violence, for we do not possess the infrastructure of an independent State. On the day the Israelis leave, we will face not only hundreds of thousands of “Palestinian” squatters armed to the teeth, but also the regular armies of every Arab State. We are not today prepared to face them. Only the presence of the Israeli occupier, the sworn enemy who seeks to exterminate us through forced assimilation, prevents them from invading and exterminating us through physical violence. Before the Israeli leaves, we must have the infrastructure and the organization to defeat them, the same way the Israelis themselves had built the organization and infrastructure needed to defeat the Arabs before they earnestly began to force out the British.
Therefore, the Israeli occupier must be expelled from our country in stages. He must be expelled with a minimum of strictly controlled violence and a maximum of unwritten “understandings” and quiet back-room deals, in a manner that builds and preserves our forces and lays the groundwork for centuries of covert cooperation between Medinat Yehudah and Medinat Israel. He must be forced into a political process whereby, in order to mollify our “angry youth” he is forced to grant us an ever-increasing autonomy in an ever-increasing space.
Thus while Jewish self-defense forces may kill Israeli policemen and soldiers who participate in pogroms and antisemitic atrocities, they must not, until the time is right, kill Israeli policemen patrolling inside the Green Line, or Israeli soldiers stationed in the Jordan Valley. While Israeli officials who order antisemitic crimes and leftist media scum who cheer them on can and should be executed by Shomrei Ivri and there is no difficulty in planting bombs in the trendy cafes of Ramat Aviv, the average chiloni ogling girls on the beach or screwing his brains out in the brothels of Neve Sha’anan is off-limits as a target. While the day must come when any Israeli soldier or policeman entering a Jewish town is greeted with exploding IEDs and well-aimed sniper fire, this day must be preceded by months and years of riots and escalations that will effectively deter the Israelis from simply destroying the Jewish communities that use lethal force against the occupier. While a mass boycott of the IDF by the dati leumi is absolutely vital to the liberation of our country, this boycott must not, for the time being, extend to Nahal Haredi. The aim of such a boycott must not be an apparent weakening of the IDF but rather the formation of units that, while nominally part of the IDF, are in reality loyal to the Jewish People and led by officers loyal to the cause of Medinat Yehudah. When we demand that only these units be stationed in Yosh and only these units be permitted to operate in Yosh, the Israelis must be able to fool themselves into believing that they are merely mollifying an unruly community by swapping one IDF unit for another.
Dear reader, Medinat Yehudah can be independent in FACT within a decade. Medinat Yehudah will not be independent in NAME for many decades to come. Before our army is openly ours, it must be nominally a part of the TZaHaL. Before our police are called the police of Medinat Yehudah, they must be called the Yosh Regional Police Force. Before our Sanhedrin can be called a Sanhedrin, it must be called a Rabbinical Advisory Committee. Before our Knesset can be called a Knesset, it must be called a Residents’ Assembly. Before our Nasi can be called a Nasi, he must be called a Council Leader and before our government is called a government, it must be called a Regional Council.
To liberate our country, we need the energy and the pure hearts of our youth. But we also need the patience and strategic planning that comes with maturity. It is absolutely vital that serious adults like yourself, dear reader, take up the War of Symbols and the cause of Medinat Yehudah before it is taken over by our Anonymous Avi and his friends. We need the youth to throw rocks and swing lengths of sharpened rebar at yassamniks. But we also need adults to explain to them WHY they are trying to kill the yassamniks with clubs and rocks when it is easier and safer to kill the yassamniks with guns and bombs. We need the youth to punish pogromschik kapos. But we also need adults to explain to them WHY this kapo should be kidnapped and beheaded on live video, while that other kapo needs to be quietly shot and yet a third kapo must, for the time being, be left alone. The mature adults, not the youth, must be in control.
As long as the older generation continues to mumble mamlachti idiocy, as long as the older generation continues to advocate the waving of orange ribbons in the face of pogroms and oppression, this will not happen. And the day will come when the older generation is completely discredited. The day will come when Anonymous Avi will take control and doom our nation to disaster. We must not allow this. For the alternative to mature strategy and adult control is the fate of Tamil Eelam.
01 Sivan 5769