Self-Liberation 101, Lesson 5.4: The Guerilla Staff and Stronghold

In this final part of Lesson 5, we will complete our discussion of classical guerilla forces by briefly talking about the nature of a guerilla battalion staff and of the guerilla stronghold it operates. Before we begin, a word of caution is in order. As always with doctrine, there exist a myriad ways to organize the headquarters of a guerilla battalion. Much depends on the availability of equipment, supplies and expertise. The author will therefore put forth his own opinion, to be treated primarily as food for thought, not as gospel truth. The author’s opinion is guided by personal experience as a staff officer of a large military force tasked with conducting operations against guerrillas while also governing a substantial civilian population. To supplement limited experience, the author relies on analysis of the functions the guerilla battalion must undertake. Those more expert in staff operations may take or leave what they wish from it. Those who seek to organize themselves can look at the examples herein as a sample objective structure toward which to build and around which to improvise as they see fit. Therefore, without further ado:

The staff of a Regional Force and Field Force battalion contains the following:

– Executive Officer – this is the second in command of the battalion. He is typically a major. His primary responsibility is to run the battalion staff, keeping everyone on task and on schedule so the battalion commander can focus on the big picture instead of staff administrivia. In addition to running the staff, the XO does everything and anything the commander doesn’t have time to do, cannot do or does not want to do. Needless to say, the XO must be a very capable officer.

– Adjutant – this officer is a captain or a senior lieutenant. He is responsible for administrative paperwork, such as unit rosters. He might have a clerk to help him, but it is unlikely. Guerilla forces are not big on paperwork. Typically Adjutant is a position where not-too-bright officers are parked. In a pinch, it can even be filled by a not-too-bright sergeant. Obviously, if the battalion operates primarily underground, unit rosters are not maintained lest they be captured by the enemy. In this case, either the position of Adjutant is entirely eliminated or all the work pertaining to it is encrypted using the strongest available encryption methods. In the modern world, these methods would be software such as GPG ( Some organizations have gone so far as to have the relevant officers commit all information to memory alone, keeping no written or electronic records whatsoever. In this type of organization, the records are written down just long enough to be memorized by the relevant personnel. The written copies are then destroyed. Obviously, the same procedures regarding record-keeping are followed by all the other battalion staff sections and therefore need no further mention.

– Intelligence Officer – this officer is responsible for the battalion’s intelligence and counterintelligence operations. He may be a captain or a major. He has a few smart officers and enlisted men to help him with the job. In some cases, he may control a small unit of highly specialized scouts whose job is to not only undertake covert surveillance and reconnaissance but also to kidnap enemy personnel for interrogation. Some Intelligence sections may also have a specialist interrogator and/or torturer. The Intelligence section also operates a chain of informants within the battalion itself and in the surrounding countryside. In addition to finding information about the enemy and trying to figure out what the enemy will do next, the Intelligence section spends a great deal of time trying to ferret out enemy spies within the battalion. Intelligence is a place for very smart, very brutal and very ruthless people. Because of what the Intelligence Officer does in a guerilla force, he and his minions are generally regarded with a strange mixture of dread, loathing, respect and fascination.

– Operations and Training Officer – as the name implies, this is a major who plans details of operations and training. For example, when the commander draws a few broad boxes and arrows on a map showing movement of A company and B company into designated areas to establish security zones while C company is held in a mobile reserve, it is up to the Operations Officer to work out the details of which company will follow which tunnels to what sleepover bunkers and staging areas at what times and present these details to the commander for approval. He has a small staff of capable officers and enlisted to help him. The Operations Officer and the Executive Officer work together with the commander to try and punch holes in the commander’s initial plan, then fix the plan. Later, when other staff members have done their own internal work, they are brought in to further flesh out the plan until it is workable enough to be actually turned into an order. This entire process is much faster and more informal in a guerilla force than it is in regular armies. Nonetheless, it is the same process. Because of his operational knowledge and command skills, the Operations Officer is third in command of the battalion.

– Supply Officer – This is a captain responsible for supplying the battalion with food, ammunition and other necessary items. In Regional Force and Field Force organizations, this officer typically has only a few helpers. Their primary job is to help coordinate with Local Force Battalions in order to draw upon supply caches set up by Local Force units in the area where the battalion operates. In cases where there are no local forces nearby, guerillas tend to depend on dedicated small groups of thieves and porters who may operate under the control of the Supply Officer or independently. However, the primary job of the Supply Officer is not to DELIVER the supplies. It is merely to LOCATE them and, if coordination is necessary, arrange for pickup. The line companies of the battalion are responsible for actually picking up the supplies at designated locations and distributing them as needed. Alternatively, if the supplies need to be stolen on a large scale or captured in a raid, the Supply Officer draws up a sketch proposal for such acquisition and works with the Operations Officer to refine it until it is ready to be briefed to the commander or the Executive Officer. Once the proposed action is approved by the commander, further planning is performed by the Operations Officer, the commander and the Executive Officer, while the Supply Officer provides consultation as needed. Of course, guerilla line companies never wait passively for resupply. Rather, they resupply at every available opportunity by stealing and capturing whatever enemy equipment they can. The high initiative of the individual guerrilla and the guerilla small unit leader is the primary supply officer of every guerilla force.

– Communications Officer – this officer is a captain. His job varies greatly depending on the level of sophistication of the force. Sometimes he may not exist at all. Since guerilla communications can span the gamut from messengers on foot to prepaid and stolen cell phones to the most modern frequency-hopping tactical radios, laser communications systems a-la RONJA ( and so forth, the only thing that can be really said about this officer’s job and that of his subordinates is that they keep everyone in the battalion talking to everyone else.

Those familiar with conventional force staff organizations will note that the guerilla staff is very minimalistic. The reason for this is fairly obvious. Guerillas tend to lack air support and artillery, chemical weapons and the like. If and when such appear, the staff is expanded accordingly.

For example, it is not difficult to imagine a Jewish guerilla force in the Holy Land producing quantities of basic chemical weapons. Mustard gas can be produced in underground labs via the Levinstein process. Phosgene and hydrogen cyanide can be stolen from industry. Commercial pesticides can be turned into nerve gases. Obviously all this would require the expertise of trained chemists and chemical engineers. However, Baruch Hashem, we Jews do not lack educated people. The possession of such weapons would obviously necessitate the creation of a specialist Chemical Warfare staff section in order to train personnel in the safe handling of these insidious materials and to advise the operational planners in their use.

In addition to the staff, the battalion possesses an aid station. At minimum, this consists of the battalion Medical Officer and Assistant Medical Officer, a doctor or a physician’s assistant, a nurse and three or four medics. The administrative burdens are handled by the Medical Officer and his assistant, who aid the battalion staff in operational planning and deal with logistics, freeing the medical personnel to focus on medicine. The job of the battalion aid station is to stabilize the wounded for transport to the hospital operated by the nearest Local Force battalion. In addition, the aid station may detail some of its medics forward with the line companies in order to improve the survival rate among the wounded. The section does not, however, handle medical evacuation. This is left to the line companies. The exact equipment of the section varies, but is generally very basic. In much of the world, it is limited to stretchers, bandages, a simple surgical kit or two, tincture of iodine and a few antibiotics. Medical instruments are sterilized by boiling or by dipping in antiseptic. Vodka or raw opium are used for painkillers if nothing better is available, and it often isn’t. Once again, given the number of doctors and medical personnel in a Jewish population, the level of care provided by the aid stations of a Jewish guerilla force is likely to be far better than the appalling level of care typically found among guerillas. Similarly, a guerilla force operating in the Holy Land should have a far easier time obtaining medical supplies and equipment than is typical for guerilla forces.

In contrast to the other battalions, the Local Force Battalion must not only perform operations in the field but also support the battalions of the Regional Force and Field Force operating in its zone of responsibility. The Local Force Battalion must also govern a community. Its commander is responsible not only for military operations and logistics, but also for the operation of the courts, policing, garbage collection, utility, infrastructure building, schools and all the other things that any local government worries about. Therefore it is not surprising that the staff of the Local Force Battalion is larger and more elaborate than the staff of its counterparts in the Regional Force and Field Force.

In addition to the staff sections present in the headquarters of a Field Force battalion, the Local Force battalion also contains the following:

–Plans section: While in the Field Force and Regional Force planning is tied directly to operations and is therefore handled by the Operations section, the Local Force battalion is different. The Local Force battalion controls a definite community, oversees its expansion and security and exerts a zone of control in an assigned area around the community or series of communities it is responsible for. When needed, the Local Force battalion must play host to several Regional Force and Field Force battalions, supporting their operations and providing them with logistical support as long as they remain in its zone of responsibility. From these duties flows the necessity of preparing and constantly updating a vast array of contingency plans and target packages. For example, if there are known hostile entities in zone, the headquarters of the Local Force battalion must identify their exact composition and strength and prepare a full targeting package to facilitate their elimination, even if forces to do so are not currently available. If the hostile entity is, for example, an enemy village, the battalion must identify the exact composition of each house in the village, identify the number of occupants, determine the arms they possess, determine the level of organization of the enemy force in the village, identify its commanders and map their locations during day and night, determine the best way to eliminate each house, identify the avenues of approach to the village and the key terrain that dominates it and otherwise gather all information needed in order to attack the hostile entity and exterminate its population. Similarly, contingency plans are prepared for establishing new outposts on various pieces of key terrain, establishing security zones oriented against specific avenues of approach into the zone and so forth. All the preparation by the plans section pays off handsomely when the battalion has to support planning by friendly forces in zone or to rapidly execute a particular operation. The author, for example, had the honor of serving in a battalion-sized entity which could, by dint of such continuous preparation, execute a raid anywhere in its zone within 15 minutes from a cold start. The contingency plans and associated procedures were routinely so well prepared that the entity was, on one occasion, able to execute 22 simultaneous raids on less than 12 hours’ notice.

–Training section: The training section is overseen by a senior major or even by a recently promoted lieutenant colonel who serves as the battalion commander’s understudy. The purpose of this section is to organize and supervise all large-scale educational and training activities and institutions in zone. This section controls the local schools, including the contents of the curriculum, the hiring, firing and promotion of teachers, the content and grading standard of major examinations and so forth. This section also runs the various major training courses the battalion must implement on an intermittent or continuous basis. These include, for example, the basic entry course for new recruits, the basic NCO course, the squad leader’s course, the officer basic course, demolition, bombmakers’ and rocket construction courses, sharpshooter, sniper, combat lifesaver and medic training and so forth. This section also prepares training materials and training aids used in individual and small-unit training within the battalion’s companies. Finally, it is responsible for building, maintaining and supervising the orderly use of all the various training infrastructure such as firing ranges, school buildings, etc. If the battalion operates primarily underground, this section is generally disguised as the educational subdivision of the local government.

–Finance: As the name implies, this section, led by a senior captain or a major, oversees taxation and the allocation of funds within the zone in accordance with the commander’s directives. Every person in the zone controlled by the Local Force battalion is expected to pay taxes to the guerrillas either in cash, in kind, or in the form of labor duty. For example, in areas controlled by the Viet Cong, every able-bodied villager was expected to dig a meter of tunnel each day. The guerrilla force may also, on occasion, make extraordinary collections or levy labor to cope with an emergency. The finance section oversees the collection of funds by authorized collectors and makes sure the collectors are honest. It keeps track of who has paid and who hasn’t paid, how much has been paid, who has worked how many hours on labor levy and so forth. In the case of individuals who refuse to pay and/or work, the finance section is responsible for ensuring that funds are collected from them against their will and for intimidating and/or punishing them in order to compel them to perform their duties to the community. With authorization from the commander, the finance section may carry out summary executions of those who refuse to cooperate, those who encourage others to refrain from cooperating, etc. The finance section is also responsible for keeping track of the money as it is spent. In the event that corruption or misappropriation of funds is detected, the section notifies the battalion commander or one of his authorized deputies, such as the executive officer. These persons then take action as appropriate.

–Court: While cases of military import, such as disrespect of superiors, cowardice under fire or willful disobedience in the face of clear orders, are handled within the battalion itself via officers’ tribunals, the Local Force Battalion must also oversee a community. Within this community, there are numerous opportunities for basic civil disputes regarding money, property, marriage, divorce, etc. In a Jewish community, to these can be added questions of kashrut, nidda, and so forth. All of these issues are handled by the civil court. In a Jewish community, this court must, of course, be a properly constituted Beit Din. The battalion commander is responsible for choosing the judges to sit on the Beit Din from among qualified candidates selected by the community’s rabbinical authorities. The commander will also, from time to time, dismiss judges from the court for various reasons and appoint qualified others as necessary.

–Civil Administration: Led by a senior major or even a newly-promoted lieutenant colonel, this section oversees and/or organizes the stronghold’s industries and enterprises. These include the production and distribution of food, water and electricity as appropriate, the production of arms and explosives, garbage collection and other municipal services. Obviously, whenever possible, it is best to depend upon private enterprise and the profit motive. But this is not always plausible. In the environment of the Holy Land, it will almost certainly not be cost-effective to drill wells for communal use, or to build and cultivate raised bed gardens to feed the community or to set up communal electricity production. Since the Israeli government makes a great show of providing electricity, water and communal services to the yishuvim, it will never be plausible to profitably undercut the Israelis on price. Nor will it be cost-effective to build military infrastructure to replace Israeli-provided IDF “security” with its ghetto walls and kapo guards. But as long as the yishuvim remain dependent on Israeli-supplied services and “protection”, they will remain nothing more than unviable suburbs . Therefore, when the Israelis decide to precipitously withdraw their services and “protection” the yishuvim will collapse overnight.

Obviously, the profit motive will not plausibly enforce strict reliance on avodah ivrit, nor will it drive the production of submachineguns, rifles, grenades, rockets, high explosives and so forth. These items must be stockpiled, used or provided to regional and field forces. They cannot be sold for profit in quantities large enough to pay for their manufacture.

The production of medical supplies can be made profitable if, as a side track, the laboratories that produce them also produce drugs for sale to Israeli addicts. But the large-scale distribution of illegal drugs, while immensely profitable, will tend to attract unwelcome attention and may be detrimental from a propaganda perspective. It may also bring the guerrilla force into conflict with criminal elements whose cooperation is useful for other activities, such as the acquisition of arms. Therefore, this is not something to undertake lightly.

Since it is not plausible to do things on a capitalistic, profit-making basis, these things must be undertaken on an ideological, communal basis, even if money is thereby lost and efficiency reduced. The goal of the civil administration is to use bootstrapping processes to produce a self-sufficient, self-reliant, closed community totally independent of all outside influence. The civil administration seeks to accomplish this goal by whatever means necessary. Since suggestions on achieving self-sufficiency in food, water, power and sanitation have been discussed in depth in the Self-liberation 101 supplement entitled “The Arguments of Lemmings”, there is no need to repeat them here.

Needless to say, if the battalion operates underground, the head of this section poses as the mayor of the community.

–Chief Engineer: The guerilla stronghold is, above all else, a fortress. It is a maze of camouflaged bunkers, tunnels, secret chambers with hidden supplies and equipment, buried communication cables, camouflaged communication antennae and so forth. The longer the stronghold exists, the more it is improved. After the defenses of the perimeter are built, interior buildings are turned into independent strongpoints. Hidden tunnels are dug to connect every building to every other building. Chambers are excavated to house the vulnerable members of the community in times of crisis and to hide supplies. Additional tunnels reach out into the surrounding zone, enabling guerrillas to move from one hidden bunker to another throughout the area without ever exposing themselves to enemy observation. Eventually some points on the tunnel and bunker network are connected to tunnels in neighboring zones. In the meantime, the community grows. New homes must be built, increasing number of children requires new kindergartens and schools, existing homes must be expanded and so forth. All of this means that construction is ongoing throughout the zone for as long as the Local Force battalion exists. The Chief Engineer and his assistants oversee this construction, ensuring work is performed to standard, with all due speed and efficiency and without wastage of resources.

–Quartermaster: The quartermaster augments the regular supply section. The purpose of the quartermaster is to stockpile supplies, disperse them for security among numerous well-guarded and/or well-hidden caches and to supervise the distribution of supplies to supported Regional Force and Field Force units. The quartermaster may also operate continuous large-scale theft or expropriation of supplies from the enemy though various schemes and scams designed to weaken enemy forces and populations while strengthening the guerrilla force and its dependent population. In the event that an opportunity for a new scheme arises and the resources of the quartermaster are insufficient to initiate it unassisted, the quartermaster will present a proposal to the Operations Officer, XO and battalion commander. Similarly, if substantial new risks arise in the context of quartermaster operations, the quartermaster will seek guidance from the battalion commander or the XO on whether the risk is acceptable.

–Hospital: Unlike the battalions of the Field Force and the Regional Force, the Local Force battalion possesses not only a small, highly deployable aid station, but a full-fledged hospital as well. The exact size and organization of this hospital is, of course, dependent on the availability of supplies and equipment. The hospital treats the population of the stronghold as well as wounded evacuated from supported battalions. The hospital administration and staff also train medics and may even train nurses, physicians’ assistants and doctors.

–Propaganda and Agitation section: This section is responsible for mobilizing morale in support of the guerilla struggle. It organizes the production and/or distribution of propaganda items such as films, patriotic songs, posters and so forth. Its agents operate within the stronghold itself and also work with populations throughout the zone. They supply propaganda items for activities such as clandestine poster pasting. This section may also run sophisticated media operations, such as an underground radio station. Finally, in a Jewish force, this section would oversee the program of daily Torah study in which all persons in the stronghold and in the battalion, down to the level of the individual three-man cell, will participate. This section would select appropriate Torah passages, halachot, Torah commentary and other related material for daily study. The selected items would emphasize the nobility of the struggle for national self-liberation, the evil nature of the Israeli enemy and the individual obligation upon every Jew to build, settle and defend the Land from all enemies, Moslem amalekites and Israeli erev rav foremost among them.

In addition to these components, it is plausible for the Local Force battalion to include a variety of specialty assets such as suicide bomber indoctrination cells, commando cells, liaisons to the Resistance Coordination Committees of nearby Marighella-style forces, if these exist, and so forth. There is nothing that can really be said about these specialist organizations except to note the potential for their existence, as their existence is dependent entirely upon the specific circumstances in which the battalion operates. The purpose of mentioning them in the first place is to highlight to the reader that the structure of the battalion staff above all else embodies the principle of FLEXIBILITY without which the guerilla cannot survive. If new sections are needed to cope with new problems, they are created. If old sections are made unnecessary or impractical, they are disbanded and their personnel are used elsewhere.

Finally, we cannot conclude our study of classical guerilla forces without speaking of the guerilla stronghold itself. As we have already learned, the guerrilla stronghold is a self-contained fortress designed to be as self-sufficient as possible. The stronghold is not merely a single village or town occupied by the guerilla force, but rather an entire zone around this town, patrolled, fortified and controlled by the Local Force battalion that occupies it. While the towns or villages where the major part of the population lives are key terrain within the stronghold, the stronghold extends far beyond them. The defense of the town from invading enemy forces does not begin at the town perimeter but rather it begins the moment the enemy enters the zone controlled by the battalion. The enemy must suffer continuous casualties, delay and demoralization with every step he takes in the zone controlled by the guerillas.

From this, we can see that the stronghold must be prepared for defense in depth, surrounded with concentric layers of defensive works and booby traps, making movement into and through its zone prohibitively expensive for enemy forces. The precise nature of these defenses depends upon the terrain and available resources. However, in brief, they comprise a bunker and tunnel network designed to make guerilla movement throughout the zone undetectable to the enemy, arrays of booby traps such as mines and IEDs covering likely enemy avenues of approach, strongpointed outposts designed to delay the enemy and cause him maximum casualties at minimal cost to the guerillas and, finally, a defensive perimeter at the town or village the guerillas defend. Within the town itself, every building is designed as an independent strongpoint able to resist and inflict casualties upon the enemy even when the main perimeter is breached. Every building has a secure, well camouflaged shelter into which the defenders can withdraw when the enemy begins to apply unbearable firepower, such as fire from tank main guns, autocannon and missile fire from infantry fighting vehicles and helicopter gunships, bombs dropped from fixed wing aircraft or howitzers operating in direct fire mode.

Once the enemy judges the resistance of the strongpoint to be suppressed, he will often send infantry to clear it. When this occurs, the guerillas emerge from the shelter, reoccupy key positions and attack the enemy infantry once the latter are inside the building or in open ground immediately next to it. It is preferable to lure the enemy inside the building, where the walls will multiply the blast from explosive devices, rendering the enemy’s body armor far less effective. A single grenade or satchel charge thrown into a room from a hidden trap door can kill or maim an entire squad of enemy infantry. By attacking the enemy infantry once they are inside the building, the guerillas make it difficult for the enemy to apply additional heavy weapon fires without endangering their own men. On the other hand, engaging the enemy while he is immediately next to the building has the advantage that the enemy has no place to hide.

Another popular technique is to wire several rooms with booby traps or even to wire the whole building for demolition. When the enemy approaches, a few shots are fired to draw him into the building. There, the enemy encounters booby traps and becomes bogged down. If and when a sufficiently large number of enemy soldiers are inside the building, it is brought down upon their heads.

Alternatively, the guerillas may lay low in their camouflaged shelters under “destroyed” or “cleared” buildings until enemy forces pass them by, then emerge to engage enemy personnel from behind or to destroy enemy armored vehicles with antitank weapons, pole mines, satchel charges or incendiary devices employed at point blank range.

Further, guerillas must move via prepared covered and concealed routes from one defensive position to another in order to disorient the enemy, achieve surprise and present opposing forces with multiple tactical dilemmas. Every position must be reinforceable via a hidden means. While in the past it was possible to meet this requirement simply by sneaking through dense shrubbery, modern thermal optics make this impossible. Vegetation, unless it is tremendously thick jungle, offers no concealment from the eyes and therefore the fires of enemy aircraft and armored vehicles. In order to be hidden, movement MUST proceed underground.

Having inflicted the maximum possible casualties on the enemy, the guerillas must withdraw to fight again another day. In guerilla warfare, there are no Alamos and Masadas. Heroic last stands are for the movies, not for the real world of guerilla warfare. Only when he is cornered with no possibility of escape does the guerilla make a heroic last stand.

From this, we understand that the shelter under every building must be a well-camouflaged bunker accessible via a hidden trap door or similar conveyance. Rather than being located directly underneath the building, the main part of the bunker may be offset somewhat and connected by a short doglegged tunnel to the building proper. This is done so that if enemy heavy fire demolishes the building or sets it on fire, or if the enemy drops an aerial bomb directly on the building in order to destroy it, the bunker may escape relatively unscathed, protecting the occupants. Of course, it is also obvious that the bunker must have additional secret exits leading elsewhere within the town. Generally one cannot go wrong if one connects every building in the town to every other building via multiple tunnels and bunkers, producing an underground maze in which the defenders can operate in order to attack the enemy. From this maze of hidden tunnels, several exits should lead to locations well away from the town, allowing for evacuation of troops well beyond any inner or outer cordon the enemy may have established as well as for counterattacks against enemy headquarters or other vulnerable locations.

We must note also that enemy forces attacking the stronghold will certainly pump smoke, tear gas, napalm and possibly even poisonous substances into the tunnels they discover. Therefore, tunnels must at intervals be protected by water traps. These are nothing more than sections of tunnel where both floor and ceiling are constructed to dip substantially. The section is then filled completely with water. Any person traversing the tunnel must submerge and swim/crawl for some time, sometimes for up to a minute, underwater before emerging again into the air on the other side of the tunnel. While persons can pass a water trap, gases and aerosols cannot. Obviously, water traps are also great locations for booby traps and hidden sentries. They are also excellent places for a tunnel to branch off in a secret direction. A person crawling through muddy water will tend to proceed more or less in a straight line unless he knows that he is supposed to turn. One can, for example, imagine designs where the straight and obvious path leads into a dead end with a booby trap, while the hidden path is the real continuation of the tunnel.

Nor should the dry tunnels be made straight. Rather, they must dogleg every few meters, making for excellent ambush and booby trap sites.

Within the tunnel maze there must be room for a large number of people to hide in relative comfort for a prolonged period of time. Not only must the permanent population of the stronghold be easily accommodated there, but the personnel of at least two Regional Force or Field Force battalions must also be able to shelter in the stronghold without ever revealing themselves. This is best accomplished by building an entire level of deep bunkers and tunnels hidden beneath the first layer of defensive communications tunnels. The depth must be substantial enough that the intervening earth will absorb the heat generated by the presence of the men in the bunkers, their lighting and equipment, thus camouflaging the thermal signature of the bunker. Care must be taken to locate deep bunkers away from any obvious targets for enemy aerial bombing, such as buildings, and to carefully camouflage the multiple redundant ventilation shafts, exits and so forth.

In general, the stronghold must be prepared to support the combat operations of the Local Force battalion and of two additional battalions for at least three months without resupply. In the environment of the Holy Land, bearing in mind that Medinat Yehudah will face a brutal War of Independence the moment the Israeli occupation forces withdraw in defeat, it is best to prepare enough supplies to last at least a year. This means that the deep bunker complex must contain numerous caches of supplies in dispersed, well-hidden locations. Needless to say, the deep bunker network must also have its own water supply. Likewise, care must be paid to sanitation, since the network may be plausibly occupied by large numbers of personnel for months on end.

With respect to radio communications out of the stronghold, it is best to use the radio sparingly and to rely on other means of communication, such as wire, fiber optics or laser link whenever possible. The enemy will always have far more sophisticated interception, jamming and direction-finding equipment than the guerillas. Therefore, extensive dependence on the radio, or its civilian analog the cell phone, for command and control will turn rapidly into a liability when the enemy begins to apply his superior technology. If the radio absolutely must be used by stationary command posts, it is best to locate communication antennae far away from any bunker. When these are used, they will always eventually be discovered by the enemy and targeted with heavy fire and/or direct assault. Since the guerilla knows this, he can prepare the antennae accordingly by providing them with booby traps and by making it difficult to find where the antenna cable leads.

Given the nature of the guerrilla stronghold, it is plausible for overwhelming enemy forces to overrun a well prepared stronghold and “clear” it, yet never discover the main bunker-tunnel complex and thereby fail to destroy the local guerrilla force. The guerrillas can re-emerge after the enemy leaves or attack suddenly when the enemy relaxes his guard.

While in the environment of classic guerilla warfare the stronghold’s villages and towns are made to look as ordinary and inconspicuous as possible, this is not, in the opinion of the author, a plausible scenario in Yosh. Since the Jewish population of Yosh is located in well known communities which are all under attack by Israeli forces and their Moslem allies, little is gained by making the yishuvim of Yosh look ordinary. Rather it is better to deter the Israelis, and even more so their Moslem allies, by making the yishuvim as overtly fortress-like and intimidating as possible. Once a yishuv begins to look and act like a fortress that cannot be stormed without heavy armor, artillery and air support, the Israelis will think twice and thrice about interfering with it. The Israeli enemy shakes in his boots at the prospect of casualties and heavy fighting. Make it obvious to them that they will lose dozens if not hundreds of men in any attempt to demolish the yishuv and the cowardly IDF terrorists will go elsewhere to look for a softer target.

With this in mind, we must conclude by examining the difference between Israeli-provided kapo “security” with ghetto walls designed for intimidated ghetto Yidden to cower behind and the fortress walls and Jewish security that must be provided by the self-defense forces of Yosh.

The foremost difference between Israeli so-called “security” and the real thing is that real security is not defensive, it is offensive. Those who wish to provide real security to threatened communities do not sit idly by and wait to be attacked. Rather, they identify the sources of threat and seek to annihilate them. Therefore, while IDF kapos make a great show of useless patrols, ridiculously expensive security cameras and other nonsense, Jewish self-defense forces will act to kill or drive away every dangerous goy within the zone of control of the Jewish security force. Similarly, while the ghetto wall is a defensive project designed to “protect” and imprison the occupants by passively intervening between them and the threat outside the ghetto, the fortress wall is an OFFENSIVE structure, designed to ATTACK the threat. The fortress wall exists not to cower behind but to provide fighting positions for the defenders of the fortress.

The fortress multiplies the power of the defenders, enabling fewer men to defend a bigger area against a large number of attackers and thereby freeing personnel for offensive operations. In contrast, a ghetto depends on alien “guards”, such as the kapos of the IDF, to “protect” the dehumanized population cowering helplessly behind its walls, while a yishuv left unwalled out of idiotic bravado wastes manpower on defensive security tasks that would be better spent on offensive security tasks.

Since the ghetto wall is defensive in nature, it is generally a single sheet of reinforced concrete devoid of parapet or crenellations or any other military augmentation. The fortress wall, in contrast, is a complex structure designed first and foremost to provide firing positions for troops in order to attack and eliminate approaching threats.

Ghetto walls near Maaleh Adumim, circa 5767

Ghetto walls near Maaleh Adumim, circa 5767

Since it is an offensive fortification, the fortress wall must, first of all, have a parapet for troops to stand on and crenelations for them to hide behind as they fire upon the enemy. It must also be augmented with towers. These serve both to house sentries and also to isolate sections of the wall, so that if a section falls into the hands of the enemy, enfilading fire from the towers can clear the wall of enemy troops, enabling the perimeter to be reestablished. Finally, the wall must be augmented with defenses against a serious military threat. This means foremost a series of hidden bunkers underneath the wall whose camouflaged firing ports will help to repel an assault by an enemy who is able to demolish the wall and towers with heavy weapons fire. It also means an antitank ditch, barbed wire and a standoff zone with a minefield.

A modern fortress wall

A modern fortress wall

In general, if the wall is to be constructed quickly, the best method is to use gabions filled with a mixture of sand and gravel. The best modern gabion is the HESCO barrier. This device is a folding basket of thin metal rods. A bag of sturdy burlap is affixed inside the basket. With large barriers, several connected baskets are used in order to divide the barrier into a series of compartments. This makes the barrier stronger and prevents the filler from settling improperly when the barriers are stacked. When needed, such barriers are quickly unfolded and filled with a sand-gravel mix or with convenient dirt if sand-gravel mix is unavailable. Even the biggest can be manhandled into place by a few persons when they are empty. The filler is then poured in and tamped down. The process is repeated until the basket is full of compacted filler. There exists no reason whatsoever why Jews seeking to defend their yishuvim from Israeli and Islamic attack cannot fabricate such simple devices.

American soldiers unfolding a small HESCO barrier

American soldiers unfolding a small HESCO barrier

In general, the barriers should be made in two sizes. The larger should be a cube measuring two meters on a side, subdivided internally into four compartments measuring 1X1X2 meters. The smaller should be a cube measuring approximately 1.5 meters tall and 2 meters on a side. These should also be subdivided internally into 1X1 meter pockets.

In order to build a minimally useful fortress wall, one would first dig a ditch at least three meters wide and at least three deep. If sand-gravel mix is available, the spoil from the ditch should be piled on the fortress side of the ditch and tamped down to form a shallow berm. If sand-gravel mix is not available, the spoil from the ditch is used to fill the barriers that make up the wall proper. Approximately half a meter from the edge of the ditch, one would arrange a row of the bigger barriers placed two deep, creating a wall four meters in depth when filled. On top of this first row, one would stack a second row of barriers. This row would only be one barrier deep. It would be set back about 30 centimeters from the forward edge of the bottom row in order to ensure the stability of the construction. Stakes with concertina wire may be placed on this small ledge in order to make it difficult to climb the wall from the outside. The top row would be built from alternating large and small barriers. The tall barriers would thus act as merlons. Defenders would stand behind these and fire diagonally over the top of the smaller barriers, engaging the enemy in front of the wall in a crossfire of overlapping sectors. The space behind the row of barriers acts as a parapet. The space between the wall and the ditch should, if wire is available, be filled with concertina wire. A standoff zone barrier of concertina wire and dug-in concrete posts would be placed at least 50m away from the forward edge of the ditch. A better distance is 100m, but terrain may make this difficult. The space between the ditch and the concertina would then be cleared of all cover and concealment. If enemy attack is likely, this space would be used as a minefield. In a more secure zone, it can be used as pasture or even to grow various crops that do not rise too high above the ground, such as potatoes. On the inside of the wall, one would place ramps and steps in order to facilitate rapid access to the parapet. From the edge of the standoff barrier, it is preferable to clear terrain up to 300 meters away of all cover and substantial concealment, such as dense bushes or large trees. This space acts as the exclusion zone of the fortress. Anything entering this zone must be seen and appropriately engaged by sentries and quick reaction forces.

Since the penetration of most small arms and light antitank weapons does not exceed approximately 1.5 meters, this wall would serve to securely protect the defenders while they attack the enemy outside the wall. Since only the heaviest weapons have a penetration greater than 4 meters, the interior of the wall is well protected, allowing personnel to move safely on the inside of the wall. The standoff barrier will prevent vehicle bombs and enemy personnel from easily approaching the wall, while the antitank ditch in front of it will make penetration of the wall perimeter impossible for enemy armored vehicles without supporting engineer assets, even if they use their heavy weapons to demolish the wall.

One would place towers on the corners of such a wall and also near any gates. These towers would be pre-fabricated structures made out of steel rail and/or metal shipping containers. These would serve as a framework to stabilize the HESCO barriers stacked four or five tall and two deep in order to protect the tower on all sides. The fighting platform on top of the tower should be at least two meters taller than the wall, enabling personnel on the fighting platform to sweep the wall with enfilading fire if necessary. The fighting platform must be provided with merlons in the same manner as the wall. Alternatively, one can enclose the fighting platform completely, leaving a long firing slit and a series of firing ports running around the perimeter of the tower. Such a design is more secure in combat but does not offer as good a position for sentries as the open fighting platform with a crenellated parapet.

The fighting platform should also be provided with machicolations if at all possible. The tower should have a sandbagged roof to protect the occupants from the sun and from mortar splinters. If the fighting platform is left open, a camouflage net should be draped from the roof in order to conceal personnel on the fighting platform from enemy snipers. If possible, the tower should be provided with a small lift counterweighted so that it naturally rises to the top of the tower when empty and slowly descends to the bottom of the tower when a weight of approximately 100 kilos is placed on it. A lift greatly facilitates resupplying the tower while in combat. Rather than climbing the tower ladder with heavy bags of water and ammunition, the resupply detail can simply use the lift. The counterweight is arranged in this specific manner to simplify casualty evacuation. A wounded man placed on the lift will descend unattended to the bottom of the tower, where medics can pick him up and render aid. The empty lift then slowly ascends back to the top of the tower.

When it comes to buildings inside the yishuv, one would protect existing ones simply by stacking HESCO barriers around them. New construction should consist of double-walled buildings designed to accommodate a layer of HESCO barriers between the outer and the inner building surface. Windows should be provided with armored steel shutters and firing ports. Roofs should be flat and reinforced against mortar and rocket fire, surrounded by a parapetted wall provided with merlons, firing ports and machicolations in the same manner as the fighting platform of a wall tower.

Each house should be built in the form of a hollow rectangle surrounding an inner courtyard with a garden. Any large windows in the structure should look out into the garden, while the outer walls should present nothing but narrow armored firing slits to the potential enemy. Each house should have a reinforced metal gate, and a concealed bunker. At least one tunnel should lead from the bunker to other locations in the yishuv.

In the center of the yishuv there should be a tall, protected observation tower. This tower would be used by sentries and also for communications and signaling.

Fortress gates are, of course, a source of vulnerability. Therefore one must take care to fortify them with towers and fighting positions. The illustration below shows one arrangement for a fortress gate.

A modern fortress gate

A modern fortress gate

This lesson completes our review of classical guerilla doctrine. In this lesson, we have learned about the organization of a guerilla staff and about the guerilla stronghold, which is a self-sufficient, self-contained fortress designed to attack the enemy, multiply the power of guerilla forces and enable these forces to exterminate the enemy in zone. Now that we understand the complex nature of the classical guerilla force and the enormous challenge of transforming the yishuvim of Yosh from helpless ghettoes full of suburbanites into mighty fortresses filled with Jewish warriors, we must reasonably ask the question: Where does one begin?

In the classic guerilla war, the guerilla force builds itself from the ground up in places that are largely inaccessible to enemy forces, be these tall mountains or dense forests, jungles or huge swamps. But none of these are available in the Holy Land. The Jewish national liberation movement must build itself from the ground up in a tiny scrap of land patrolled continuously by the IDF and placed under a microscope by the Shabak. How are fortresses to be built when hordes of kapos descend at the drop of a hat to demolish even unauthorized chicken coops? How are troops to be trained and taxes to be collected when the Shabak would instantly arrest anyone behaving in any manner suspiciously?

Yes, activists can put on Beged Ivri and begin a War of Symbols. Yes, it is possible to spread the message and symbols of Medinat Yehudah among the youth of Yosh. It is possible to organize riots in response to antisemitic atrocities and tiny cells of dedicated fighters working in absolute secrecy can even undertake some security operations, such as attacks against infrastructure, small-scale raids, IED attacks and drive-by shootings. But the idea that entire battalions of guerillas could be trained in Yosh under the nose of the Shabak, the idea that fortresses would rise out of the ground and a whole parallel State would be created out of whole cloth seems preposterous, does it not? How is such a thing possible?

The answer, dear reader, is that as long as we stay within the bounds of classical guerilla doctrine, it is NOT possible. The Israelis THEMSELVES must not only choose a policy of non-interference with the Medinat Yehudah movement, but they must actively aid and abet this movement. The Israelis THEMSELVES must provide this movement with arms and funds, elevate its legitimacy and strive to build its power in order to establish Medinat Yehudah. The ruling elite of the State of Israel must be forced to not only acquiesce in the creation of a Jewish State but to actively abet it!

Impossible? Yet consider, dear reader, a few simple facts. It is a fact that the Israelis imported an Islamic terrorist army from Tunis, an entire organization of Arab Nazis bent on genocide. It is a fact that the Israelis supplied this Nazi army with arms and funds and continue to do so. It is a fact that the Israelis deliberately outed their own informant network to this organization, killing hundreds of their Arab agents and severely weakening their own intelligence capabilities. If their purpose was merely to destroy the Jews of the Holy Land, drive them into ghettoes and forcibly secularize them, surely they could have figured out how to do it without endangering the very existence of the Israeli State?

Indeed, were they operating in a vacuum, this would be true. The Israelis could have found another way. They did not have to import Arafat and his thugocracy from Tunis. A thorough push for “education reform”, “civil rights” and “rule of law” would have sufficed to accomplish their purpose with far less danger to themselves. But the Israelis were not operating in a vacuum. The Israelis were utterly terrified of an enemy so horrible, so implacable and radical that, compared to it, Arafat and his Nazi thugs seemed MODERATE. Next to Hamas, Arafat seemed REASONABLE. The Israelis sought to empower “moderates” in order to defeat terrifying radicals!

And so, dear reader, we have the answer to the puzzle of Medinat Yehudah. Yes, determined activists must put on Beged Ivri and spread the message of Medinat Yehudah. Yes, we need a War of Symbols and riots and demonstrations and demands for independence or at least autonomy. But there must be one more component in order to achieve victory. A few hundred determined Jewish men and women must unleash upon the Israeli elite a reign of terror so horrifying that the elite will do anything in order to make them stop. Virtually every single one of these men and women will be hunted down and murdered by the Shabak to the enthusiastic cheers of addled Jewish lemmings. They will be derided as “terrorists” in the press and reviled from the pulpits by sellout “rabbis”. They will find no succor and no helping hand in all of the Land of Israel. Yet their selfless sacrifice will save the lives of six million. They will die, but they will take thousands of the Israeli elite with them. They will kill the monsters who give the orders to commit pogroms and expulsions. They will kill the inhuman beasts who carry out such orders. They will torture and behead Israeli politicians, kapo commanders, sellout “rabbis”, traitorous “reporters” and foreign “peace activists” on live video. They will demand the immediate restoration of Torah Law throughout the Land. And they will so horrify the Israeli enemy that he will seek to empower the moderates in Beged Ivri, the reasonable folk who merely want a separate Jewish State alongside the State of Israel, who do not vow holy war without end until the overthrow of the illegitimate secular Israeli regime and do not openly proclaim a burning desire to hang every chiloni politician and media personality off a lamppost.

A few Jewish heroes must willingly sacrifice their lives so that millions may live. A few must take upon themselves a life of hiding and opprobrium in exchange for the gratitude of generations yet unborn. A few selfless warriors must follow in the footsteps of the Maccabees, pitting the pure flame of towering faith in Hashem against the wave of Hellenist darkness that threatens to engulf and annihilate our people. How this is so and what must be done we will learn in upcoming lessons.

4 Responses to “Self-Liberation 101, Lesson 5.4: The Guerilla Staff and Stronghold”

  1. General Raoul Salan Says:

    What makes you think that your little plan for insurrection will not meet the same sticky end as the OAS met? They too launched an insurrection against their mother country on behalf of the settlers. In the end, the OAS insurgents were suppressed by the French Army and then were rendered irrelevant by a handover of Algeria to the Arab majority!

  2. Vienna Mike Says:

    Qui, Messir General, answer me a few simple questions and the answer to your own will become obvious. Did the pieds noirs comprise 1/3 of the population of France? Did they form 2/3 of the combat arms rank and file of the French Army? Did they comprise 1/3 to 1/2 of the French combat arms officer corps? Did the vast majority of them live in mainland France? Could they get to Algeria simply by walking two kilometers cross-country? Did their total population approach parity with the Arab population of Algeria? Did they have a population growth rate six to ten times that of other Frenchmen?

    There are two million dati leumi. They comprise 66% of the combat arms rank and file. They form 33% of the combat arms officer corps. The newer classes of officer cadets are invariably 50% or over dati leumi. The average dati leumi family has five or six children, while families with ten or even twelve children are not uncommon. The birth rate of the Israelis in Tel Aviv is barely above 1 and DROPPING.

    There is a popular delusion that the dati leumi camp is somehow “tiny” or “powerless”. This delusion is fostered by the Israeli elite in order to maintain their own power. But the elite themselves do not share this delusion. For 20 years they have been desperately plotting to exterminate the dati leumi community precisely because its ever-growing might poses such a tremendous threat to the power of Israel’s godless rulers and, indeed, to the very existence of the Israeli system.

    Which brings us to another reason why the secession of Medinat Yehudah can be made to work. When push comes to shove, the ruling elite of the State of Israel wants only control, wealth, comfort and security. It could not care less about the holiness of the Land or the divine mission of the Jewish People. Thus, if given the credible opportunity to obtain peace by sheltering behind a Jewish State, the Israelis will eagerly surrender everything except for the Haifa-Tel-Aviv coastal strip where 70% of their population resides. They will then disband their armed forces and spend the rest of their pathetic existence wallowing in materialism until, in a century or two, their single-digit birth rate will ensure their complete extinction.

    We do not have to kill them. They will happily, joyously, poison themselves to death with Western so-called “culture”. That’s all they want. If we stop being a threat to them and instead become their shield, they will kiss the ground we walk on.

    A serious, realistic demand for Jewish independence from Israel will immediately split the ruling elite, divide the IDF and effectively end the Israeli status quo at a stroke. Medinat Yehudah will, if we play our cards correctly, arise out of this maelstrom almost overnight, emerging like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully formed, armed and armored. If we play our cards wrong, of course, there will be a Second Holocaust. But since a Second Holocaust is 100% certain if we do nothing, let us make Ceasar’s choice and say: “Let the dice roll!”

  3. General Raoul Salan Says:

    Two million dati leumi? From what I’ve heard, they are 10 to 15 percent of the population. Maybe if you add in the haredi or even some not-so-observant Jews, you can get two million. Remember two million is a third of Israel (what is it now? six million Jews and a million Arabs?), which includes an Arab fifth, a (non- or anti-Zionist) haredi population that forms a growing sector in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, etc., and a million Russian Jews who are largely secular (due to the influence of the USSR). Remember also that while the Sephardim may not be kibbutzniks, they also tend to be lukewarm in their observance (hence Kahanist rants about leftwing brainwashing). And they’re half the Jews. So unless what I’ve stated is COMPLETE misinformation, estimates that the dati leumi are 10 to 15 percent of the population seem correct, with the low end more likely than the high end!

  4. Vienna Mike Says:

    Au contraire! You fall into the trap set for you by the Israeli enemy, of sowing divisions between Jews.

    Your “completely secular Russians” are overwhelmingly anti-haredi and many are allegedly atheist, but the vast majority long for some kind of spiritual connection to something higher than themselves. Today, they waste their time on faith healers, christian missionaries and UFOs. But does this need to continue forever? And you have no idea how MUCH the “Russians” HATE and DESPISE the ruling elite. Even many of the “Russian” yassamniks who beat Jewish children at Amona beat them as much out of the twin frustrations that these children had the courage to resist the State they despise on the one hand and that they did not resist with arms as they manifestly should on the other hand, rather than out of conviction that the State is right. The “Russians” fear the oppressive power of the Israeli State, but if it stumbles even for a moment and shows its true weakness, they will be the first to turn upon it and tear out its throat. Oh, and did I mention that they pretty much form the other 33% of Israel’s combat arms rank and file?

    As for the Sephardim, why do you count only the milk-white boys in knitted kippot who went to Merkaz HaRav as dati leumi? I say to you that every Jew who observes mizvot, keeps Shabbat and wants a strong Jewish State is dati leumi! Some of them simply don’t know it yet. And why do you so eagerly discount all the haredim? Chabad wears black hats instead of Beged Ivri, but does that REALLY mean that the students of, say Rav Sholom Dov Wolpe, will not pick up rifles to fight for Medinat Yehudah?

    Why, Messir General, do we have the concept of the War of Symbols? I say to you that a radical forefront need only raise the banner of Medinat Yehudah high and every Jew in Israel who hates the “peace process”, despises the ruling elite and longs for a strong Jewish State will in good time flock to this banner. Indeed, this is the very DEFINITION of the War of Symbols! There are 600,000 Jews in Yosh and East Yerushalayim. 99.999% of them will, with the correct conduct of the War of Symbols, self-identify as supporters of Medinat Yehudah. And so will, ultimately, virtually every Jew who wears a kipah or lights Shabbat candles, and quite a few who don’t. Two million is a deeply conservative estimate.

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