Self-Liberation 101 Lesson 5.2: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mao Doctrine
Self-Liberation 101 Lesson 5.2:
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mao Doctrine
The typical insurgency built around Mao doctrine is, if you would like, a “corporate model” insurgency. There is a Supreme Command at the top, generally headed by a single leader or a very small group. Below this are well defined subsidiary structures. There is a political arm, The Party, that engages in propaganda and recruitment. The Party is also the outward, diplomatic face of the insurgency. It is this part of the organization that, for example, generally interacts with Western media. There is a Field Forces command and associated Field Forces. The Field Forces are, for all intents and purposes, a standing army. They range over the entire theater of operations, carrying out a full-scale war to the best of their ability and in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Command. There is a Logistical Command responsible for financing and procurement of equipment. Finally, there is a Guerilla Forces Command. Sometimes this command is subordinate to the Field Forces Command. Sometimes it is an independent entity.
Under the Guerilla Forces Command there are Regional Commands responsible for specific areas, such as provinces and administrative districts. Regional Forces subordinate to this command are semi-full time forces. These deploy generally only within the confines of the region. Much of the time, they are ostensible civilians. Regional Commands are responsible for organizing supply of the Field Forces operating within their area at any given time. While they do not generally provide sophisticated equipment, they do provide food, shelter and basic repair activities. In some cases, they may provide stolen or home-made weapons and explosives as well. Regional Commands are also responsible for construction of infrastructure and for local administration.
Answering to the regional command are Sector Commands. These run Local Forces, perform the actual infrastructure development, run day-to-day underground and overt administrative activities, etc. This, in short, is where the rubber meets the road.
Local Forces are organized in a variety of ways. In areas where enemy presence is heavy, they may be organized into small cells, wherein every member knows only two subordinates and one superior. In areas where enemy presence is weak and in no-go areas free of government forces, Local Force personnel are organized into companies and battalions. The Local Force rarely fights except in defense of its immediate turf. It exists primarily as an aid to administration, training, logistics and law enforcement. However, small elements of the Local Force may be highly trained and may, on occasion, perform significant actions. Typically, the guerilla starts his career in the Local Force, is eventually selected to be part of a Regional Force and may go on to the Field Force from there. Experienced cadre often move in the opposite direction in order to increase the competence of Local and Regional forces or due to age or desire to settle down. In short, the insurgency is a combination of underground army and underground government. Its structures are easily grasped by those who have experience with large organizations.
The major advantages of an insurgency organized along the classical lines of Mao doctrine are its unity of command, coordination and centralized planning. This force is efficient in operation, it is easily synchronized and directed, and it delivers exceptionally high impacts. Not only can such forces render huge areas untenable for the enemy, they can also undertake spectacular operations, causing the destruction of infrastructure and enemy personnel on a massive scale. Because Field Force, Regional Force and even reinforced Local Force units can consistently deliver high impact and often operate from prepared strongholds, defeating the Mao insurgency requires commitment of large numbers of troops. Typically, it is necessary to commit one soldier for every ten civilians in an occupied zone in order to defeat a Stage 1 insurgency. Such capital investment can bankrupt a government. The unending stream of casualties from high-impact operations of the guerillas tends to produce discontent relatively quickly, especially if the enemy media are easily suborned. In short, the Mao insurgency works and works well.
However, this model also has major disadvantages. First of all, its centralized nature is its Achilles heel. This system requires extensive communications between the Supreme Command and its subordinates. Communications are vulnerable to intercept and can often pinpoint the exact location of guerilla force leaders and major units. Enemy forces with high mobility can then pile on and defeat the guerillas in detail. Communications are also vulnerable to spoofing. As the FARC recently discovered, false orders inserted into the communication stream by enemy operatives can cause the guerilla force to defeat itself. Because the force employs centralized planning as well as decentralized execution, it is relatively slow to react to regional and theater changes. Because it depends on trained cadre, it is vulnerable to depletion of same and also to decapitation.
US and Colombian forces choke FARC communications and logistics.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080710/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/colombia_choking_the_rebels;_ylt=AsVQgLKFX_wLXDBuwI7lNEms0NUE This is a typical modus operandi against Mao-style guerilla forces. The American intelligence services (e.g. NSA) are especially effective at this. While extensive use of couriers, dead drops, cutouts, GPG, TOR and other privacy tools can mitigate these risks, the risk of communications intercept crippling the organization is always present. The recent bloodbath experienced by the LTTE appears to have the same roots. One major mitigator is the ability to produce own software using published algorithms (for example, the source code and RSA algorithms for PGP are public). This prevents tainted software from being inserted into the organization by enemy forces. Another major mitigator is communications discipline. If you cannot send operationally critical data via 2048-bit asymmetrically encrypted email attachment from a one-time use anonymous email account acquired and accessed via TOR, don’t send it. Never use a phone or a radio for any communications except for short-range tactical comms.
But the greatest difficulties with a classical Mao insurgency are its dependence on inaccessible terrain to shelter the guerillas and on a steady supply of large quantities of materiel. It is notable that the truly great successes of classical Mao doctrine forces all depended on an outside source of supply. Mao Tse Tung himself depended on massive aid from the Soviet Union and was forced at one point to nearly abandon China and shelter inside the USSR. Ho Chi Minh depended on Soviet and Chinese aid. Robert Mugabe not only received material aid from the Communist block, but was able to portray himself in such terms to Western media as to force an international blockade of Rhodesia.
Whether sheltered by distance, borders, dense jungles or all of the above, all the forces sighted above absolutely could not have survived without such shelter. In an environment where government forces can concentrate immediately in any part of the country without any signs of preparation, where inaccessible terrain is simply unavailable and an outside line of supply does not exist, a classical Mao insurgency cannot operate effectively. Nonetheless, there is much to learn from Mao.
First of all, we learn from Mao that popular support for the guerillas is a complex creature. It is not necessarily the case that the populace needs to love the guerillas. Few loved the Viet Cong. But the Viet Cong ruled nonetheless. Much like Machiavelli’s Prince, the ideal guerilla is all things to all people, feared and loved in equal measure. He must blend with the people, provide vital services such as just and impartial law enforcement, charity for the needy, aid for the poor, judgment among litigants and all the other things associated with a just government.
The guerilla must engage in a war of symbols, building popular support by engaging the enemies of the people while simultaneously educating them on the true nature of the enemy. At the same time, the guerilla must be ruthless and merciless to his enemies. He must strike terror into the hearts of the people while he simultaneously inspires their admiration. He is the indispensible source of social services and also the terrible sword of retribution to informers. He raises funds by all available means. Like a government, he levies taxes. Like a criminal organization, he may engage in drug dealing, smuggling and wide-scale fraud to raise funds. He may raise funds from a sympathetic party or parties abroad. He may engage in kidnapping for ransom. In short, the guerilla does anything and everything to win.
While the ideal guerilla is both loved more than the government and feared more than the government, like Machiavelli’s Prince it is better for him to be feared than to be loved. However, like Machiavelli’s Prince, the guerilla cannot long survive purely by terrorizing the populace he operates among. Those who depend too much on terror and not enough on symbols and social services often suffer the fate of Sendero Luminoso.
Thus from Mao we can deduce certain core features of any insurgency that would seek to liberate our country from the Israeli occupier. A hypothetical initial insurgent organization would operate in tiny cells and absolute secrecy. It would perform careful target development in order to ensure that its operations are meticulously planned and the guerilla force is preserved to fight again. It would never operate where it lives. For example, if the insurgent makes rockets in Yitzhar, he would test them in the Negev and fire them at Gaza. At the same time, its operations must be public knowledge. It does no good to, for example, simply fire a rocket at Ramallah. It is vital that the Jews of the Holy Land as a group know that a Jewish self-defense organization has fired a rocket at Ramallah. Propaganda and symbology are far more important than military effect during the initial stages of an insurgency. Everything the guerillas do they would do to send a message: “we are here, we are fighting, we will not quit, others will join us, we are strong, we will win”.
Despite the fact that Medinat Israel is a greater enemy than the Moslems, it is important to recognize that the addled Jewish sheeple of the Holy Land do not understand this fact. Like a dog being beaten with a stick, they bite the stick and not the man who wields the stick. Thus the average Jew wrongly believes that the Arab terrorists are responsible for the daily terror attacks against the Jewish People. The fact that the Israeli government finances, arms and aids the Arab terrorists escapes the notice of the average Jew. The fact that the Israeli State could effortlessly end all Arab terrorism in less than 24 hours but chooses not to do so escapes the notice of the average schlemiel on the street. The average Jew thinks himself Israeli and, in his confusion, believes that the Israeli murderer who daily plots to kill him is his brother.
Therefore, the hypothetical Jewish self-defense organization would undertake high-profile reprisal attacks against the Moslem population. Such an organization would initially seek to maximize Moslem casualties while avoiding Israeli casualties. Its goal would be to inflict tenfold the damage done to the Jews while maximizing publicity. It would tie its reprisals to specific Moslem actions and would be careful to ostentatiously announce every success while never taking credit for any failure. In this respect, the excellent work of the likes of the as-Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media Publication must be cited as an outstanding example of doctrinally correct guerilla propaganda.
For example, the hypothetical guerilla organization might repeatedly destroy the electricity pylons leading into Gaza, blowing up not one or two transmission towers but an entire line of towers over several kilometers. Every time the Israeli enemy restores the electric supplies to his Moslem allies, the insurgency might blow them up again in a different place. The insurgency might likewise destroy sections of water pipe that supply Ramallah, Nablus or other large Moslem squatter colonies or are used by the treacherous Israelis to convey water to the Jordanians.
Israeli kapos, whether green-uniformed or blue-uniformed, would be killed only if they get in the way. When they are killed, it would be important to maintain secrecy. If, for example, a kapo patrol stumbles upon a rocket cell as it is setting up the launchers, the security element of the cell would be careful to open fire immediately and to make absolutely certain that every single kapo is killed without reporting who attacked them or why.
At the same time, the resistance would spread the message that the Israeli occupier is solely responsible for the Moslem terrorism in the Holy Land. With the aid of the resistance, the average Jew would come to open his eyes and perceive finally that the Moslem terrorists are mere tools of the murderous Israeli occupier. The strategy of infrastructure attack would certainly help to reinforce this message. The sight of Israeli repair crews scurrying to promptly restore power and water to Israel’s Moslem allies while these selfsame allies redouble the attacks on Jewish cities and towns would do wonders to show the Israelis’ true priorities and intentions. The message would be reinforced in every manner possible. Posters, graffiti, jokes told on busses and in coffee shops, web sites, blogs and internet video would all play a part. It is even conceivable, though difficult and expensive, to organize mobile underground radio teams or to broadcast the truth off a US-flagged ship in international waters. Once the message of the resistance begins to sink in, it will be acceptable in the public eye to begin killing Israeli kapos, starting with the repair crews that come to repair destroyed infrastructure. To this end, the insurgency might lay clever booby traps and secondary devices, use indirect fire ambushes or even identify, arrest, try and execute individual kapos.
For every Israeli escalation and oppression, the resistance would likewise escalate, and escalate tenfold. If the Israelis demolish Jewish homes, the resistance would demolish Israeli homes. If the Israelis attack Jewish women and children, the resistance would attack Israeli women and children. If the Israelis kidnap Jews, try them in Israeli kangaroo courts and hold them hostage in Israeli prisons, the resistance would take Israeli prisoners, try them in Jewish courts and hold them until an exchange is made.
The more ruthless the Israeli escalation, the more ruthless would be the counter-escalation. If the Israeli kapo who raises a club against a Jewish child receives the severed hand of his own child in the mail the next morning, a thousand other Israeli kapos would think twice about attacking Jewish children. The ruthlessness of the insurgency and the spinelessness of the effete Israelis would eventually result in a series of “understandings” that would restrict Israeli operations.
In these escalations, it is important that the resistance target those responsible for Israeli policy above the addled lemmings who follow them. The posh cafes of Israel’s elite would make better targets than the whorehouses frequented by Israel’s underclass. Also, care would be taken to avoid Jewish casualties during escalation. Fortunately, this is easy to do. For example, hypothetical resistance operatives know that Jews do not eat at un-kosher restaurants. Therefore un-kosher restaurants are excellent targets for escalation. Similarly, the resistance would know that Jewish women dress with tziniut. Therefore if, for example, it becomes necessary to escalate by eliminating some number of Israeli women in exchange for an Israeli rape or murder of a Jewish woman, it would be easy to identify and avoid targeting Jewish women by mistake. Also, hypothetical resistance operatives would know that Jews do not expel Jews. Therefore, they would know with certainty that no Jews can be present among any units of Israel’s security forces that participate in expulsions or have done so in the past. This simple logic would do quite well to guide the resistance.
While all this goes on, propaganda and organizational cells of the insurgency would engage in a ruthless war of symbols. Their goal would be first to build Jewish will to reject Medinat Israel as a foreign occupier and then to eject the Israeli kapos from Jewish population centers. To this end, these cells would organize sabotage, riots and violent demonstrations, encourage the public to reject Israel’s laws, courts, army, authority and even mode of dress. They would cause the public to question the very legitimacy of the Israeli State. As result of their activity, Jews who join the IDF or the Israeli police would be shunned, spat on and eventually physically harmed. Israeli police entering a Jewish town would be greeted first with rocks and then with gunfire. Known Sabak informants would simply be killed by individual citizens or, at the very least, forced to flee to territories under Israeli control.
At the same time, the organizational cells would provide social services, curb crime as necessary and otherwise establish Jewish law. For example, they would organize underground courts where Jews could receive Jewish justice and whose verdicts would be enforced by the armed resistance. While Yad L’Achim spends its time risking Jewish lives to liberate Jewish women from goyim only to see these women go back to the goy because the goy threatened their family, the insurgency would simply send men to mow down the goy and his entire extended family in the middle of the night, liberating the woman once and for all and thereby discouraging further goyshe depredations against Jewish womanhood. While Jews who go to Israeli courts to evict goyim from a plot of land face endless and meaningless proceedings, the insurgency would exterminate goyshe squatters and leave their heads up on pikes as a warning to others. These actions would build the loyalty of the Jewish population even while they intimidate those who would cooperate with the Israeli occupier. By providing such services, alongside with the more mundane relief such as jobs, free education, dowries and so forth, the resistance could then legitimately demand fair taxes from the populace.
Certainly only rabbis affiliated with the resistance would be permitted to operate in Jewish towns and these rabbis would be tasked with collecting taxation in the form of compulsory tzedakkah. The ancient Jewish institution of the Tzedakkah Committee would thus become the insurgency’s tax collector.
Once Israeli forces are ejected from Jewish population centers, the insurgency would establish local authority, build defenses, organize local forces and establish industries. In short, they would establish Jewish authority in place of Israeli authority, Jewish economy in place of Israeli economy and a policy of fostering Jewish self-defense in place of Israel’s deliberate policy of fostering Jewish helplessness. As the Jewish self-rule areas grow, they would merge into larger administrative regions, eventually producing an autonomous region that is an independent State in all but name.
At this point, we know from Mao doctrine, “peace” negotiations should already be ongoing. Within a relatively short time, the insurgency and the State of Israel would come to an agreement regarding borders, transfer of equipment, a phased Israeli withdrawal and all the mechanics of formally establishing Medinat Yehudah.
However, the Jewish resistance cannot be a normal resistance for yet one more reason. When Israel withdraws, the real battle will only begin. For on the day the Israelis leave, the Moslems will invade in force. For this day, every able-bodied adult in Medinat Yehudah must be well prepared. The armed forces of Medinat Yehudah must emerge from hiding immediately and, operating from well prepared positions, decisively repel the Moslem onslaught. If they are unsuccessful, Judah will die before she is born.
For this reason, the Jewish resistance must be far more thorough than most in the preparation of its strongholds and the organization of military forces within its communities. We will speak about strongholds and organized forces in the next installment of this lesson.
However, before we leave off, we must speak briefly about self-financing. As we know from Mao doctrine, all sources of financing are fair game as long as they do not harm the insurgency or the populace it fights to liberate. Therefore, most successful self-financed insurgencies finance themselves by producing and selling drugs to the enemy. Other methods of financing include taxation of the populace and expropriation of enemy resources via direct robbery or theft. Also, sophisticated schemes involving identity theft, counterfeiting, credit card fraud and so forth have been becoming more popular in recent years.
There are only two limitations involved in this kind of financing activity. The first is that the resistance should take care that criminal enterprise does not become a goal unto itself. If the resistance is perceived as nothing more than a criminal enterprise hiding behind slogans, it will certainly begin to fail. The way to avoid this is to maintain a simple lifestyle and to keep social services flowing to the people. The second limitation is that the insurgency should not do things that appear dishonorable in the eyes of the people. For example, the insurgency might operate whorehouses staffed with goyshe women in Tel Aviv. But such whorehouses should not operate in Hebron.
In addition to self-financing through criminal enterprise, expropriation and taxation, insurgencies are financed through false front operations. These are either legitimate businesses operated by resistance members solely in order to provide funds, cover and materiel to the resistance or charities whose collections flow into resistance coffers. For example, all Moslem charities are actually fronts for Moslem guerilla movements.
This brings us to the most successful practitioners of self-financing. In the jungles of northern Ceylon, there is a country that appears on no map. For nigh on forty years, this nation has maintained its independence against incredible odds. Though recognized by no State and supplied by no one through most of its brief history, this nation has carried on. The nation whereof I speak is called Tamil Elam.
First among the unique factors that have enabled the modern-day resurrection and survival of this ancient country is the bravery and tenacity of her troops. The warriors of Tamil Elam are rightly called Tigers, for they display unparalleled ruthlessness, courage and will to victory. Few are as eager to fight for their country as the Tamil Tigers and few face death as willingly.
However, equally important is the existence of a loyal Tamil diaspora in India, Europe, Canada and the United States. This diaspora provides cover for the fronts of Tamil Elam, be they criminal operations, charities or legitimate businesses. It also provides contacts for the acquisition of materiel and direct financing of operations via monetary contributions from individuals. In short, the success of Tamil Elam can be directly attributed to the simple fact that in many places outside his homeland, a representative of Tamil Elam can blend into a community that shares his culture, language and religion and contains numerous individuals willing and able to aid their country in her hour of need. Those who insult the Jewish diaspora and insist on immediate mass aliyah while sitting limply on their hands and doing nothing to resist Israel’s illegitimate occupation of Medinat Yehudah would do well to think carefully on the example of the Tamil Tigers.
In the next installment, we will talk about the stronghold and its local force battalion.