Self-Liberation 101 Lesson 5.3: The Local Force Battalion

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Having examined the doctrine of Chairman Mao and spoken about the lessons to be derived from this doctrine, we will now talk about the organization of doctrinally correct Mao-style guerilla forces. For our purposes, we will speak of a Local Force battalion. The reason we will speak of this particular unit is that Regional Force and Field Force battalions largely replicate its combat structures with better quality troops and more/better equipment. Thus if we understand the combat structures of the Local Force battalion, we understand the combat structures of every line battalion. In addition, the guerilla battalion is a basic self-contained building block for larger guerilla units. It is capable of essentially self-sufficient operations for prolonged periods of time. It is also the largest guerilla unit that is likely to exhibit uniformity. Above the battalion, guerilla units rarely exist on a permanent basis except very late into Stage 2 and are therefore ad-hoc formations assembled for specific operations. Incidentally, the creation of competent regimental and brigade headquarters is among the greatest challenges in preparing for a Stage 3 transition.

For these reasons, it makes sense to talk of the battalion rather than, say, the brigade. In addition, the Local Force battalion has the dubious distinction of integrating women and youth into operations. This integration presents unique challenges and halachic issues that a Jewish force would have to cope with. These issues are not present in either the Regional Force or the Field Force, since women and youth under 18 are generally barred from these units. Finally, the Local Force battalion is tied intimately into the mechanisms of local government and the logistical support of the insurgency. For this reason, it also has unique structures and concerns that are not found in other guerilla organizations.

Before we begin, a word of caution is in order. These structures and notes represent the author’s take on a variety of best practices in this field. Nothing here is to be taken as holy writ. There are many other doctrinally correct ways to do what the author describes. As always with doctrine, this work is presented as a basis upon which to build and improvise in accordance with circumstances, NOT as a cookie-cutter solution applicable to all problems in all times. The reader is urged to carefully consider his own local problems and issues before applying parts of the knowledge gathered herein in accordance with his specific needs.

Before we speak of the Local Force battalion itself, we must speak of the general principles of organization that the guerilla force must follow. First among these is the rank structure of a guerilla force.

The roots of rank structure in any military organization always draw from the structure of the society that forms it. Traditional western military organizations took shape between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century CE. They still bear the stamp of the society that produced them. In that society, a small landed aristocracy lorded it over masses of peasants and a leavening of urban artisans. The officers, naturally, were all noblemen. The idea that gentlemen such as themselves would serve in the ranks and perform manual labor was, of course, completely abhorrent. The rank and file would be formed of conscripted peasantry. These, in turn, would have no hope of ever becoming officers. To manage the peons and perform various tasks the gentlemen found to be beneath themselves, such as day to day administration, care and feeding of the men, the officers employed their servants. The French word for these men was “sergent”.

Over time, it became necessary to create a hierarchy of sergeants to manage the increasing complexity of technological warfare. Having a large number of enlisted ranks also helped to give the illusion of progress to enlisted personnel, keeping armies socially stable in an age of growing egalitarianism. The desire to give the sergeants more job satisfaction also created the term “Non-Commissioned Officer” (“NCO”), which is how enlisted men who command other enlisted men are generally known in the modern world.

Throughout this evolution, the officers remained “gentlemen”. While exalted birth slowly gave way to professional academies and college programs designed to make officers out of scholars, the basic idea remained. This resulted in the phenomenon of wet behind the ears lieutenants straight out of college being thrust into command of dozens of men with greater skill and experience than themselves, including senior NCOs old enough to be their fathers. At the same time, the evolution of warfare resulted in an ever increasing need for experience at the forward edge of battle. These twin pressures created a system of essentially dual, parallel and conflicting command structures. The officers’ Chain of Command parallels and interferes with the NCO Chain of Concern and vice versa. The system is, of course, absolutely unsuited to modern society and often interferes with the conduct of operations and training. Its sole redeeming feature is the fact that it prevents new lieutenants from screwing up too badly by doubling them with experienced senior sergeants. Men brought up by modern societies have an additional problem dealing with the system as it is so obviously un-egalitarian and archaic. Nonetheless, the system persists.

Military organizations are naturally conservative and a certain pride attaches to the position of both officer (“the brains of the army”) and NCO (“the backbone of the army”). And, of course, humans can make almost any organizational structure work given enough time and effort. Traditional armies can afford the inefficiency associated with this bizarre dual set of authority and the break-in period for officers. Ultimately, these organizations fight rarely, if at all, and the resources of an entire modern nation-state can be expended to shore them up at need. The margins of waste and error introduced by the inefficiencies are outweighed by the massive organizational changes required to bring the military organizations back into line with the structure of modern societies.

Guerilla forces cannot afford such luxuries. They do not have the near-infinite resources of a nation-state. They cannot afford confusion, dual chains of command, inexperienced officers and other such nonsense. To their advantage, guerilla forces are much simpler in organization, possess a relatively light logistical tail and, most importantly, are organized from scratch, without inheriting the baggage of eighteenth century absolutism. Therefore, in a guerilla force, there are only three enlisted ranks: private, corporal and sergeant. Above these are officers — junior lieutenant, lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major and so forth. There are also notions of “trainee” and “cadet”, but these are more administrative designations than actual ranks. There are also technical specialists without formal rank, such as doctors, bomb makers, skilled mechanics and so forth. If one so desires, one can designate them as “specialists” and “warrant officers”. Since guerillas generally wear no insignia, know each other personally and typically have few technical specialists among them, the details of this arrangement are not very important. The key point is that everyone will know who the technical specialists are and no one will expect to take commands from them in the heat of battle, except for situations in which their technical expertise is being exercised (e.g. triage of wounded or the deployment of a field aid station).

With the exception of technical specialists, who of course have special educations and skills qualifying them for their position, all guerillas start as privates and advance through the ranks as they gain skill and experience. Generally, there are training courses at the local level for new privates, as well as leader courses for corporals, sergeants and junior lieutenants. The training of higher ranking officers is organized as necessary, often on a regional basis. Most training, however, is on-the-job training. Guerillas learn by observing and imitating more senior guerillas. The primary function of every guerilla leader at every level is to train his immediate subordinates to do his job. Emphasis is placed on daily small-group instruction and personal mentorship. Both military skills and political indoctrination are conveyed to the guerillas on a continuous basis. The goal of all training is to develop individual initiative, quick thinking, a capacity to improvise, a solid foundation of military skills and the self-confidence that comes from all of the above.

A major side-effect of this system is the automatic respect and family-like cohesion that develops within a guerilla unit. Subordinates clearly see that their superiors possess a wealth of experience and knowledge and are working assiduously to share this knowledge. In turn, this brings confidence in and respect for the leaders. The leaders’ close, constant interaction with their subordinates fosters a deep knowledge of each individual, an appreciation of his strengths and an awareness of his limitations. Unlike leaders in regular armies, who often rotate from unit to unit every couple of years, guerilla leaders serve with the same unit for decades, slowly climbing the rank structure not at set intervals but when they are deemed ready and positions are available. This creates a situation in which numerous experienced men are ready at a moment’s notice to fill the shoes of a fallen leader. There are no wet-behind-the-ears new lieutenants in a guerilla force, nor are there dual chains of command.

By virtue of this system, guerilla forces have far better cohesion than traditional regular troops, often display greater initiative, have a far stronger will to fight and tend to find clever ways to improvise their way out of difficulties. The downside of the system is, of course, the potential for cronyism and associated corruption.

Now that we understand the guerilla unit’s chain of command, we must speak of the organization of guerilla units. The foundation of the guerilla organization and the ultimate guerilla unit is, of course, the individual fighter. By virtue of his motivation and dedication to the cause, coupled with his education as an underground warrior, the guerilla can continue to operate even alone and will carry on the battle against the enemy even if he is the lone survivor. This is the first and fundamental difference between the guerilla and the average soldier of a regular army. The average soldier in a regular army serves for pay and promotions. When separated and alone, unless he is a member of an elite force, such as the U.S. Army Rangers, he is helpless and uninterested in anything except personal survival. The guerilla fights for a higher cause. When separated from other guerillas, he will continue to fight to the best of his ability.

However, the individual is severely limited in his capabilities. The individual has to sleep, has to eat, has to attend to bodily functions. When moving across terrain, a single individual cannot even secure himself, as he can neither see nor hear in all directions at once. The three-man cell can. The three-man cell is the foundation of all guerilla formations. It is composed of a cell leader and two subordinates. It is a completely independent small unit, capable of carrying out complex missions on its own.

The origin of the three-man cell is the classic underground cell structure of a resistance organization. In such an organization, a member knows only three others – a superior and two subordinates. The members at the bottom of the organization know a superior and a peer. As result of this organization, a single member of the underground knows very little about the activities and composition of the organization as a whole. Even if the enemy arrests and successfully “breaks” a single member, little is gained. The enemy’s counterintelligence apparatus is forced to slowly “roll up” the resistance, one member at a time. If at any time the chain of arrests is broken, the investigation dead-ends. Since resistance members are trained to go to ground the moment someone they know is arrested, the enemy’s security forces are racing against time. In the case of many dedicated resistance organizations, the enemy’s task is further complicated by the fact that resistance members are sworn to die fighting or to commit suicide on capture. The ultimate example of such dedication is, of course, the habit of wearing suicide belts adopted by many Islamic guerilla movements.

The Local Battalion three-man guerilla cell often starts out as an underground resistance three-man cell and may transition into one at any time. For example, if the enemy forces overrun a guerilla stronghold, surviving members of the Local Battalion would go underground and continue to harass the enemy until he withdraws.

The other reason guerillas organize themselves into three-man cells is in order to facilitate training. It is well known that training is best accomplished in small groups, especially when it comes to manual tasks. The presence of a peer allows the individuals undergoing training to practice with one another, generating additional questions for the teacher and enhancing the mastery of the material. Therefore, the smallest class size is three persons – a teacher and two students. Guerillas cannot afford shoddy training. Shoddy training costs lives. Unlike the regular army of a nation-state, with its huge resources, the guerilla army must view each individual warrior as a very valuable asset. The individual guerilla may be willingly sacrificed if the objective to be gained is sufficiently valuable. But his life is never expended lightly. For this reason, guerillas train as much as humanly possible. Ideally, skills are practiced daily. However, real life is often far from ideal. After every operation, the cell would also hold an after-action review, noting what happened and why, how improvements can be made and what mistakes were made. The purpose of these sessions is not to cast blame, but rather to facilitate learning and improve future performance.

Note that the next higher sized unit that can adopt the instructor-and-peer training method is a five-man unit. Indeed this is the size of a western-pattern fire team. However, the quality of instruction diminishes somewhat, as the instructor’s time is split between two pairs of students. Further, conventional forces generally use squad leaders, not fire team leaders, as primary instructors. This results in even less attention being paid to the individual student. This is why, given equal time and resources, guerilla forces will always be better trained than their conventional counterparts. Of course, guerillas almost never have equal time and resources.

Another reason to have a three-man cell flows out of training. In order for the guerilla force to be successful, it must devote significant attention to the motivation and political consciousness of each guerilla. The same three-man cell that daily practices military tasks must also daily engage in motivational mental exercises designed to inculcate the ideals of the movement and a will to fight and die in order to advance these ideals. In the case of the Jewish guerilla force struggling to liberate occupied Medinat Yehudah, the motivational exercise would, of course, take the form of daily Torah study focused upon the necessity of liberation, the evil nature of the godless Israeli enemy and his Moslem allies and the need for unending struggle in order to attain the goal of national liberation. By blending Torah study with discussion of current events, it is possible to continuously focus the mind of each guerilla upon the need for liberation and to imbue him with the spirit of self-sacrifice and undying hatred for the enemy that is key to victory.

Finally, we come back to the three-man cell as an independent unit. Note that conventional forces use the two-man “buddy team” as the basic unit. This arrangement has its advantages. However, the conventional force never sends a two-man buddy team on an independent, long-term mission. A two-man team cannot perform such a mission.

For example, consider the task of continuous observation. A single man cannot perform this task. The reason for this is that, within approximately an hour, an observer begins to lose focus. His mind wanders and he is unable to maintain attentive observation of his sector. It is for this reason that the average TV sitcom runs for about an hour, with about 45 minutes of content and about 15 minutes of commercials. A single observer also has the problem of being unable to simultaneously pay attention to both the immediate area around himself and his sector of observation. He has no local security. Therefore, issues of attention span aside, the single observer is hideously vulnerable. A two-man team can maintain continuous observation for a short period of time, with one man observing while the other provides local security. The two members will switch tasks at semi-random intervals of roughly every hour. But a two-man team cannot rest. As fatigue builds, the observer becomes less effective. Therefore the two-man team becomes ineffective within 12 hours or less. On the other hand, a three-man team can perform this task for days on end. Two men work while one man rests. More men can be added to make the task easier, but one quickly runs into diminishing returns. Guerillas cannot afford to waste manpower.

Consider also the issue of casualties. A two-man team becomes essentially ineffective if one man is killed or wounded. A single man, as we know, cannot secure himself during movement and therefore has great difficulty carrying on the mission. On the other hand, a three-man cell can carry on if one member becomes a casualty. When it comes to evacuating a wounded comrade, a two-man team is in real trouble right away. One man has great difficulty carrying another for an extended distance. On the other hand, a three-man team is able to perform the task efficiently. Two healthy men can easily carry a third.

Similar issues arise with almost any other task. A notable exception is bounding movement. In this type of movement, one element is stationary and covers the movement of the other element. After the first element has finished moving, it sets and covers the movement of the previous element. With a two-man buddy team, little training is needed to make this happen. A three-man cell, on the other hand, has to train more extensively. When a three-man cell bounds forward, it is generally necessary to adopt a “scrolling” motion where two cover while one moves. An alternative method is to assume risk on one of the bounds and have one man cover two as they move. However, such a decision is suboptimal and is to be avoided unless time is absolutely of the essence. One man cannot efficiently cover two.

A discussion of the three-man cell cannot be complete without a discussion of equipment. First of all, we must note that beggars can’t be choosers. The guerilla fights with whatever equipment he can capture, steal, purchase, produce or otherwise acquire. The luxury of standardization is therefore generally unavailable. However, whenever possible effort should be made to standardize at least on the level of three-man cells. For example, if we have on hand two M4s, two AKs, a Negev and an RPK, it is better to equip one cell with AK/RPK and the other with M4/Negev. If nothing else, this makes it easier to train within the cell and to resupply with ammunition. In an emergency, men whose weapons share compatible magazines and compatible ammunition are far better off than men who do not have this advantage.

Another item that must be made note of is suitability of equipment. The guerilla’s weapon must be durable to the point of being nearly unbreakable, reliable under almost any conditions, simple to operate and easy to learn. It must also require little maintenance and be easily amenable to storage underground or in other difficult conditions. Finally, it must be possible to manufacture and repair the basic guerilla weapon in improvised workshops, given only a minimum of tools and whatever decent-quality metal is available.

All of these considerations point us toward a simple conclusion – for a guerilla, if it wasn’t designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov, it’s crap! The AK and its derivatives are designed to break into a minimum of parts. A complete idiot can be taught to operate and maintain an AK in 15 minutes. AKs are rugged and reliable, designed to be banged around by peasant riflemen under almost any conditions imaginable for years on end. When diving for cover, you can jam the steel plate at the bottom of an AK butt into the ground with all your might to break your fall. Don’t worry, the butt won’t break, no matter how many times you do this. You can bash in a man’s skull with the butt of an AK or use it to break down a wooden door with equal fidelity. If you need to boost a man over a wall or into a window, there is no need for an assault ladder. Grasp the butt, have your buddy grab the barrel. The third man steps on top of the rifle and you boost him right up. Try this with an M4 and it will break in half.

The AK requires virtually no maintenance whatsoever. An occasional cleaning with an oily rag will do fine. To clean the barrel, take a pair of shoe laces or a length of 550-cord, tie a knot, oil it and pull it through the barrel. Every other part of the weapon that requires cleaning can be reached with your fingers. To bury it, cover it with grease, wrap it in an oil-soaked rag, put it in a tied garbage bag to waterproof it, and you can sink it in a muddy lake for a decade without worry. When you need to use it, pull it out, load and shoot. The weapon will not care an iota about the heavy grease inside the works. It will also not care if the ammunition you are using is hand-loaded using banged-up old brass and home-made powder, or if it’s dirty, or if there is sand all over the works. It’s an AK. It will shoot.

Need to make and/or repair AKs in an improvised workshop? Have no fear; you are not the only one. It’s been done all over the world, from the jungles of Vietnam and Mozambique to the mountains of Pakistan. As long as you have a halfway-competent gunsmith and some basic tools, you’ll be fine. Your products probably wouldn’t qualify as the world’s most accurate or most reliable AKs, but they will still work, even if you make them out of crappy steel. The AK was designed for this.

The disadvantage of an AK is, of course, that it is heavy. Some complain that it is less accurate than the M16, but, frankly, this has more to do with the quality of steel used to produce the weapon, the ammunition and the skill of the shooter than it does with the design itself. Good-quality AKs, such as the ones produced in Bulgaria by Arsenal, are just as accurate as most M16s. You can even get them in NATO 5.56 caliber.

On the other hand the fragile, temperamental M16 and its derivatives make awful weapons for guerillas. These weapons require constant maintenance. The M16 must be cleaned daily in most environments. In the desert, it is not uncommon to clean it twice a day. Those who have deployed to either Iraq war with the US Army no doubt remember the ridiculous sight of soldiers covering the muzzles of their rifles with condoms and rubber caps to keep the dirt out. One could even see soldiers walking around in the desert with their rifles wrapped in garbage bags! They were right to be so paranoid. Dust sticks to gun oil. One little speck of dust inside that toy so-called weapon, and its bolt will not cycle properly. It will jam, double-feed or do some other ridiculous thing in the middle of a fight when your life depends on it.

One good blow will break an M16. No one would dare use one to boost a man into a window. The M4 is worse. The American army took to issuing its soldiers knee pads because it is impossible to break one’s fall with the butt of an M4. Try it and the little piece of plastic will shatter like glass. Some M16s have the nasty tendency to fire when the butt receives an impact. Needless to say, this can be downright dangerous. The magazine release button may be convenient, but it’s exposed. Many an American soldier has been mightily embarrassed when, while getting into or out of a vehicle, he brushed his weapon against something only to see the magazine fall out! To add insult to injury, many M16 magazines are also fragile. Try dropping a loaded M16 magazine onto an asphalt road from the top of a vehicle and watch as the spring pops out!

The M16 and its derivatives are also finicky about the quality of ammunition, making it difficult to fight with hand-loaded ammo, especially if it is made using home-made powder. They also tend to require extra training to use effectively. Add to this the unfortunate fact that M16s stored assembled for long periods of time tend to develop extractor problems. This author remembers watching a company of the Louisiana Army National Guard draw rifles out of the back of a truck and march onto a range to get ready for deployment to the Gulf. The rifles had sat in a climate-controlled arms room, fully assembled, for some prolonged period of time. Of the 120 soldiers in the company, at least 35 walked off the range with extractor failures. While the American regular army soldiers around the author exchanged remarks about the incompetence of the National Guard when it comes to storing rifles, the author considered whether a mobilizing company of the Red Army reserve would have had such a problem, even if its rifles had sat assembled in dusty boxes in some basement for 25 years.

Of course, the M16 is light. Toys always are, when compared to real tools. Superpower regular armies with unlimited budgets and glorified gendarmeries whose primary purpose is to bash children’s heads in with clubs can afford to use toy rifles. Guerillas cannot, unless they have no other choice.

Now that we have talked about weapons in general, let’s talk about the equipment of a three-man cell. The three-man cell is an independent unit often tasked with separate missions. Therefore, it must have all the capabilities of an independent unit. It must have the capacity to lay down dense automatic fire. It must have the capacity to engage armored targets. It must have the capacity for accurate aimed fire. It must have the capacity for indirect fire. It must have the capacity to fight for a prolonged period of time. It must have the capacity to communicate internally and with other units. It must be standardized logistically to then greatest extent possible. It must have the capacity to care for and evacuate its wounded. From these requirements flows the ideal armament of the unit.

The three-man cell is armed with a light machinegun. Ideally this machinegun is an RPK. It is also armed with an antitank rocket launcher. Ideally this launcher is the RPG-7. It has assault rifles. Ideally these are high-quality AKs. It also has an under-barrel grenade launcher. Depending on availability, this weapon can be the venerable GP-25/GP-30 and its derivatives (, or a variant of the M203 that is compatible with the AK, such as the Bulgarian UGBL-M6 ( If neither is available, one falls back on rifle grenades. If necessary, these can be manufactured clandestinely. Similarly, in the absence of the RPG or similar weapon, a variety of disposable rocket launchers (such as the RPG-18) or home-made rocket launchers can be employed. In general, as the Russians have recently found out in Chechnya, home-made weapons can be manufactured from a wide variety of items, if one has the necessary technical education and imagination. For that matter, one need not go as far as Chechnya to find home-made weapons. Gaza will do.

The weapons of the three-man cell are distributed as follows. The leader carries an AK with a grenade launcher. One man carries the RPK. The other man carries the RPG and an AK. Ammunition load-out depends on the mission and available resources. If the mission involves heavy direct fire contact, each rifleman should ideally have 10-12 loaded magazines for his rifle. This comes out to 300-360 rounds. The machine-gunner should have 9-10 loaded drums for his RPK. This comes out to 600 — 675 rounds. There should be 4 – 6 rockets for the RPG. The leader should have 6 – 8 grenades for his grenade launcher. Depending on the mission, there might also be 2 – 4 hand grenades per man, assorted IEDs, smoke, pyrotechnics, fire bombs, etc. If the mission calls for a lower probability of direct fire contact, the cell might carry less ammunition and more of other supplies. Examples of such missions include rocket launch, large-scale IED emplacement and large-scale infrastructure attack. In some cases, the cell might, for example, forgo the RPG launcher in order to carry more explosives. The load might further be modified if the cell will travel all or part of the way in vehicles or if propaganda footage is required. For example, virtually every IED mission will likely involve a video camera to record the event.

Those who believe that these hundreds of rounds constitute too much of a load must understand that firstly, the guerilla cell must be capable of independent combat. The cell must be able to lay down a punishingly high volume of fire in order to induce shock in the enemy, inflict significant losses and break contact. Secondly, one must note what the guerillas are NOT carrying. Nowhere in the guerilla arsenal are found the bulky and heavy but often useless flak vests and helmets that burden regular force soldiers. These things over-insulate the men and add weight that is better used for ammunition. All they do is slow men down and make them miserable. For every man whose life is saved by a flak vest, another is killed or wounded because he cannot move properly. It is difficult to lie down in a flak vest, much less crawl in one. When forced to perform basic infantry combat tasks, men loaded down with flak vests and helmets become exhausted within a few hundred meters at the most. For this reason, American regular force soldiers in Iraq, for example, are unable to make the guerillas stand and fight unless the guerillas want to do so. While the exhausted Americans pant from doorway to doorway, their Moslem opponents swiftly run a few blocks and go to ground. Add to this the cost of a flak vest and helmet. All in all, the combination can run from $2000 to $3000. For that price, it is possible to acquire between 2 and 4 top-notch AKs. Given the limited budget of a guerilla force, what sense does it make to spend money on feel-good safety blankets instead of vital equipment like weapons and ammunition?

The guerilla must be mobile. He must strike and withdraw. Therefore, not only is he unburdened by helmets and flak vests, he is also unburdened by any but the most basic supplies. When operating in the field, he carries a little food, a few liters of water, a spare pair of socks and a blanket if he is lucky. The entire weight on his back is vital equipment. He carries nothing extra.

In addition to the basics of weapons and ammunition, the leader must generally have a means of navigation. Typically this means a compass and a map. Various GPS-enabled devices are becoming more popular, but these cannot replace the compass and map, only supplement them. There is also a loud whistle ( for internal communication. For external communication, radios of various kinds and even cell phones have been used. Note that cell phones can be a source of vulnerability, as they emit a signal even when not in use. In many cases, the cell phone can only be rendered “silent” by removing the battery. A high-tech enemy, such as the Israeli occupation forces, may use the cell phone to track the guerillas. Pyrotechnics of various kinds are also popular as means of communication.

Every guerilla must have a basic aid kit. At minimum this is a basic first-aid bandage and a tourniquet. In the post-Soviet space, the former is sometimes nothing more than a clean bandanna wrapped up in a plastic bag and stuffed into a pocket, while the latter often takes the form of a convenient length of rubber tubing wrapped around the butt of the soldier’s AK. In Eretz Yisrael, it should not be difficult to procure much better first aid kits, such as these kits deployed by the Americans ( In addition, the cell may have a more advanced first-aid kit, such as the American CLS kit ( If so, every member will be trained in its use. Another useful item would be a poleless litter (

Of course, this describes the ideal state of things. In the real world of guerilla warfare, things are never ideal, supplies are always short and one fights with whatever is available. Operational considerations might even render the entire construct above invalid. For example, a cell whose mission requires operation in crowded urban terrain is better served by grenades, pistols, submachineguns and sawed-off shotguns easily hidden under shirts and jackets than by full-sized assault rifles. Or it might dress up as enemy soldiers and hide in plain sight, strolling to target with casually slung M4s. The three-man cell remains the three-man cell. Beyond this, improvisation and mission focus are the keys to survival.

Of course, guerillas don’t operate solely in three-man cells. There are larger units. These units are constructed out of three-man cells.

In order to construct units above the three-man cell, we must understand the basic principle of guerilla organization known as the rule of threes. The rule of threes simply states that any superior unit is composed of three subordinate units plus a headquarters as appropriate. The rule of threes is born out of the ambush, which is the basic guerilla method of tactical engagement. In order to conduct an ambush, one must have three basic elements. There must be a primary ambush element that kills the enemy, an observer element that warns of the enemy’s approach and a security element that protects the other elements from unexpected attack. Another reason for the rule of threes is the observation that a basic attack must have two elements – a support by fire element and an assault element. However, the support by fire element should generally have 2/3 of the firepower of the assault element, as it has to lay down a punishing barrage of fire, killing many of the enemy and totally focusing the attention of the rest while the assault element maneuvers to destroy the enemy by close assault from the flank.

Now that we understand the basic unit of the guerilla force and the rule of threes, we should not have difficulty deriving higher-level units. Of course, the basic three-man cell consists of two privates and a corporal. Above this, we have the squad, which is led by a sergeant. The squad contains, ideally, three cells and a three-man headquarters. Considerations of manpower and weapons availability, as well as difficulties with adequately training leaders may reduce the number of subordinate cells from three to two. Another consideration that may dictate such a reduction would be the need to operate primarily underground. Since in this case secrecy is more important than firepower, it is better to have only two subordinate cells, so that fewer men may be killed if the squad leader is captured and tortured into revealing the identities of the rest.

The headquarters of the squad is armed as follows. The squad leader carries an AK. He will position himself wherever he is needed. This generally means leading the assault or other main effort. There is also a machinegunner armed with a medium machinegun. Generally this should be the PKM, although other machineguns, such as the M240B (AKA FN MAG 58) commonly found in Eretz Yisrael, are only slightly inferior when it comes to reliability and durability. However, when it comes to weight, the M240B weighs about 13kg loaded. The PKM weighs about 8 kg. Further commentary, as the Russians say, is unnecessary. The third member of the squad headquarters is a designated marksman with a scoped weapon. The best weapon for this role is the SVD.

As usual for AK derivatives, the SVD is tough, reliable and tolerant of abuse. Thanks to Dragunov, who spent most of his career designing Olympic target rifles, the SVD is quite accurate. Note, however, that the SVD is not a sniper rifle in the western sense. The western sniper rifle is a weapon designed for a highly trained military specialist who, working with a spotter, fires a single shot at a high-value target, such as an enemy general, from a kilometer or more away, hits the target and goes to ground. The western sniper spends most of his time hiding and gathering information. His weapon meets his needs. It is generally an extremely high-quality bolt-action rifle accurate to below one minute of angle. In contrast, the designated marksman with an SVD is a member of the infantry squad. He works at ranges of 300 to 800 meters, firing rapidly but accurately at high-value targets in support of the squad’s offensive or defensive mission. His typical shot is taken at 500-600 meters. His targets are enemy marksmen and snipers, enemy machine gun and rocket teams and, of course, enemy officers and NCOs.

In an assault, the machinegunner and the designated marksman join the support by fire team. In an ambush, the machinegunner is part of the primary ambush team, along with the squad leader. The designated marksman may be emplaced as part of the primary ambush team or as part of the security team, depending on circumstances.

The next higher unit is the platoon. The platoon if composed of three squads and a platoon headquarters. It is led by a lieutenant. A junior lieutenant serves as deputy commander. Besides the task of assisting in command of the platoon, for example by commanding the support by fire element, the deputy commander is responsible for the logistical and maintenance tasks associated with running the platoon. The commander, while responsible for everything the platoon does or fails to do, is primarily concerned with training and operational planning as well as battle command.

Both these men have bodyguards / radio operators. Whether or not the officer has a radio and whether or not he chooses to carry this radio himself instead of employing a radio operator is irrelevant. “Radio operator” is a secondary duty. The bodyguard’s primary job is to keep his officer alive while the latter moves about the battlefield and commands the battle. Typically, these men are sergeants in training to be junior lieutenants. As such, one may term them “cadets”. In addition to their battlefield tasks, they spend their time learning the lieutenants’ jobs and assisting with the administration, training, care and feeding of the platoon.

Depending on the availability of equipment and the operating environment, the platoon headquarters may also be reinforced with one or two cells armed with additional machine guns, RPG launchers, SVDs or even weapons such as mortars, ATGMs or heavy machineguns. These provide additional firepower assets to the platoon commander. If the platoon is expected to perform truly extensive independent missions, it might also have a trained medic with an appropriate aid bag ( Typically, the battalion Strike Platoon will receive such reinforcements, whereas the line platoons, especially the line platoons of Home Company and Second Company, will not. Thus the guerilla platoon may vary in size quite drastically even at full strength, from as few as about 30 to as many as 50 men.

The next higher unit is the company. As might be expected, the company is composed of three platoons and a company headquarters. The company headquarters has a captain to command the company, a senior lieutenant to serve as executive officer and another senior lieutenant to serve as logistics officer. Every one of these men should have at least one radio operator/bodyguard. In addition, there are certainly at least 2 medics at the company level. The company headquarters will often include several cells armed with heavy weaponry. Typical examples of this could include 60mm and 80mm mortars, ATGMs, recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns such as the KORD, the NSV, the AGS-30/AGS-17 or the M2 Browning. The one item to be avoided unless there is no other choice is the American Mk.19 automatic grenade launcher. If the Americans have a weapon more finicky than the M16, this is it. Besides being a reliability nightmare, the Mk.19 is renowned for its high dud rate. As many as 1/3 of the grenades it fires may fail to go off on impact. Unlike the grenades fired by Soviet-pattern automatic grenade launchers, the American grenades have no back-up timer. If they do not go off on impact, they will go off unpredictably at the lightest touch thereafter. This means that every time you fire a Mk.19, you create a minefield. Maneuver through areas thus contaminated by your own duds would be quite disconcerting.

The next higher unit is the guerilla battalion. The battalion is, at base, composed of three companies and a headquarters. In addition, the battalion has a specialized spearhead force that answers directly to the battalion commander. The Local Force battalion is further complicated by the fact that its component companies are very different in nature, quality and assigned mission.

The Local Force guerilla battalion is the only guerilla battalion type that has a permanent “home”. Regional Forces move about within a given region as circumstances dictate. Field Forces range about the entire theater of war. But the Local Force Battalion occupies a single stronghold. It is the one structure every person in a guerilla-controlled area has constant contact with. In fact, every able-bodied adult in a guerilla-controlled area who is not a member of the Field Force or Regional Force is a member of a Local Force Battalion. The Local Force Battalion is composed of the Strike Platoon, the Headquarters, the Field Company, the Home Company and the Second Home Company (AKA Second Company). Sometimes the headquarters grows so large with reinforcing assets that it becomes a conventionalized Headquarters and Headquarters Company. However, this is a rare occurrence except in the Field Force and very late during Stage 2 operations. Before we talk in some detail about these units, we must address the unique challenge associated with the Local Force battalion. This challenge is the integration of women and youth into the force.

As we have already learned, guerillas cannot afford to waste manpower. Every able-bodied person able to contribute to guerilla operations within a liberated area is recruited to do so, regardless of gender. However, when it comes to women there are special challenges.

First of all, let’s put aside the sexist nonsense that “women can’t fight”. Any idiot who still believes this is welcome to crack open a history book and look up the 46th Taman Guards Night Bomber Regiment. During the Great Patriotic War, this regiment had the honor of amassing more than one thousand sorties per pilot, over twenty-three thousand sorties in all. TWENTY-THREE Heroes of the Soviet Union were awarded to members of the regiment between June 1942 and May 1945. Add to this the regimental Order of the Red Banner and Order of Suvorov III-rd Class. Virtually every pilot and navigator in the regiment was awarded at least one lesser decoration as well, most of them for courage under fire. The Night Witches were probably the most highly decorated single regiment in the history of the Red Air Force. And, by the way, they flew through most of the war without parachutes. When choosing between parachutes and bombs, the choice always fell on bombs until the skill of the pilots became so great that even the callous Red Air Force decided that their lives were more valuable than one more dead Fritz. When parachutes were finally issued, many of the pilots did not want to wear them! No one who watched the Night Witches’ airplanes overfly Red Square in the final victory parade of the Great Patriotic War would dare utter the idiocy “women cannot fight”.

In fact, there was an entire female air group, the 122d. Besides the legendary Night Witches, it also contained the 586th Fighter Regiment and the 587th Bomber Regiment. Neither had anything to be ashamed of when it came to combat record. Lest morons claim that women cannot fight on the ground, we can also bring up the Red Army’s female snipers. Take Lyudmila Pavlichenko, for example. If the Hero of the Soviet Union medal proves insufficient to convince the overly sexist, 309 confirmed kills, including 39 enemy snipers, speak for themselves. There were more than two thousand female snipers in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. Women also served in every other position, from frontline infantry, armor and artillery to the more conventional nursing and air defense artillery jobs. The author’s grandmother, may she rest in peace, was among them.

Now that we have dispensed with the sexist nonsense once and for all, let’s talk about the objective reality of women in combat. The first question we must ask is not “can women fight?” The answer to that question is quite obviously “absolutely yes, and just as well as men”. The question we must ask is “should women fight?” And the answer to THAT question is far more interesting.

Let us perform some simple arithmetic. How many children can a woman bear in her lifetime? For the average woman, given general good health and adequate nutrition, the answer is anywhere between twelve and twenty children. The realities of social pressures and economics often further reduce this number by over 50%. However, let’s assume optimal conditions for a moment. Let’s assume that every woman who is freed from the necessity for work outside the home and is protected from external dangers will produce twenty children. Note that we CANNOT safely increase this number by using technology. No one has of yet invented an artificial womb. It is true that, with the recent advantages in pharmacology and reproductive medicine, older women could, theoretically, receive eggs fertilized in vitro and carry these to term. But this procedure cannot be termed “safe”.

Now, how many children can a man sire, even under less-than-optimal conditions? Would it surprise you to know that a man can easily sire well over 200 children? Examples abound. To name one, King Sobhuza II of Swaziland sired 210 legitimate children with no artificial aid whatsoever. Furthermore, a man’s capacity to produce children can be readily enhanced through technological means. In fact, it is reasonably safe to say that with modern methods such as in-vitro fertilization and artificial insemination, we can obtain an order of magnitude improvement in efficiency. And let us note that the male is far less involved in the entire reproductive process than the female.

This is the objective tyranny of biology. Hashem so created the world that a man who sires 200 or even 2000 children is not removed from the workforce, nor is such effort a particularly great danger to his health. In fact, most healthy young men would take great pleasure in an effort to accomplish such a feat by conventional methods. On the other hand, a woman who bears 20 children is completely removed from the workforce, greatly endangers her health and spends most of her life occupied entirely with pregnancy, childbirth and child-rearing.

So there you have it. A woman’s life is, even at the most conservative estimate, TWO ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE more valuable than a man’s! When you add in the social costs, a more realistic valuation may be three orders of magnitude. A society can lose 90% of its able-bodied adult men and recover within a generation. A society that loses 90% of its able-bodied adult women is dead. Men are expendable. Women are precious.

Given the arithmetic, let’s put the arguments of modern feminism in perspective. If you can make equivalent nails from two materials, but one is 1000 times more expensive than the other, what kind of idiot do you have to be to make nails from the expensive material? How many 32-karat gold nails have you seen at a construction site lately? Perhaps you know someone who stokes their fireplace with hundred-dollar bills instead of firewood? Yet moronic feminists would have us use golden nails and stoke fireplaces with hundred-dollar bills just to satisfy their puerile fantasies of gender equivalence!

For a moment, forget Halacha and forget all other arguments. Simple biology and basic logic tell us that an able-bodied Jewish woman should NEVER be placed in any kind of danger whatsoever! She should not be permitted to even work in a potentially hazardous civilian occupation, much less serve in a front-line military organization. She is too valuable. She should be at home making Jewish babies, not dodging bullets at the front with the men!

In fact, given the biological realities and our demographic situation, one must seriously question the intent of those who would permit feminist nonsense in our society. While this author does not suggest that all those responsible for such deviations should be summarily shot, we should certainly consider what criminal liability should attach to the advocacy of feminism in a Jewish State.

The only time the incredibly valuable female life can be endangered is when there is no other choice. When there is no firewood and life is threatened by a blizzard, fireplaces are stoked with hundred-dollar bills. When there is no iron and lives are threatened, even golden nails must be used. Women should be trained to defend themselves as this will make them safer. But they should not fight except under the most desperate conditions imaginable.

Now that we have established that women should only fight in times of desperate emergency, the next logical question to ask is “how should women fight?” To this also biology and psychology can provide an answer. This answer, incidentally, is confirmed by historical experience. So let’s have the facts.

Fact number one. Women are less physically capable than men. On average, men are 30% larger and up to 100% stronger. The difference is especially noticeable in upper-body strength. Human factors scientists will tell you that, for healthy young men, the 90-th percentile two-man overhead lift, for example, is roughly 120 lbs. The two-woman ninetieth-percentile overhead lift is somewhere in the neighborhood of forty pounds. Similar problems arise when comparing men and women in terms of endurance.

Another important item to consider is bone density. Not only are women weaker, they are also more fragile. The average healthy young woman has about 2/3 of a healthy young man’s bone density. The implications for combat performance are too obvious to be further discussed.

In response to severe physical stress, female bodies become damaged fairly quickly. The culprit here is the female period. When a woman’s body is placed under severe physical stress, the reproductive system shuts down. This produces hormonal side effects resulting in the classic “female athlete triad syndrome”, the most devastating component of which is osteoporosis. In many cases, the damage is permanent. Once a woman loses bone density and develops osteoporosis, she is often unable to recover even when stress is removed. She will live with the consequences for the rest of her life.

On the other hand, the male body placed under severe physical stress experiences rapid muscle growth and an increase in bone density. Men under consistent physical stress tend to experience increases in aggression, increased sexual drive and an increased appetite. Women tend to experience eating disorders and psychological problems. This is not prejudice. It is biology.

Fact number two. Men and women are psychologically different to the point of near incompatibility. What motivates men tends to de-motivate women and vice versa. One need only walk to the local high school and observe the varsity football team at practice to perceive the kind of interaction men find to be motivational. The “band of brothers” effect and the patterns of male dominance are self-evident from even a brief observation. Compare this interaction to the interaction of a group of young women, even if this group is, say, a field hockey team. One immediately notes the completely different behavior, utterly incompatible means of motivation and the totally different manner of asserting authority. One need not follow either team into the locker room to observe the manner and topics of conversation to determine that the genders are as alien to one another as cats and dogs.

Is it any wonder that, when placed together in a mixed group and given a physically and psychologically stressing long-term task, both genders perform WORSE than when they are separated? Between sexual tensions, misread signals, perceptions on the part of men that the women are “getting away with” inferior performance, perceptions of being treated “unfairly” on the part of the women and so forth, it is a wonder ANYTHING gets done at all. The cohesion of military units is destroyed or severely damaged by “integrating” the genders.

Actual combat experience bears this out. The Night Witches, formed in 1942, were quite free of modern political correctness and idiotic feminist excesses. From the beginning, the regiment was 100% female and wanted absolutely nothing to do with males. From the pilots to the navigators to the armorers and mechanics and every last member of the ground crew, not a single man could be found. The regiment’s formidable commander, Colonel Yevdokiya Bershanskaya, acted as a veritable guard dog to keep this state of affairs, refusing all offers of integration and going so far as to create an independent regimental recruiting and training program in order to avoid male replacements from the Red Army replacement stream. Through most of the war, the regiment recruited where it fought and trained its own crew. So aggressive did this policy get that when a male communications technician was sent to install some new radio gear in the regiment’s planes, the poor man was all but hounded out of the regiment. Not only did he end up eating all of his meals alone and talking to no one on any non-business topic, he was accidentally-on-purpose issued a set of female underwear! Needless to say, the moment the new gear was installed and the regiment’s female communications staff trained in its maintenance, the poor man transferred out. He had completed his assignment in record time – less than a month.

This is not to say that the regiment’s women hated the male of the species. These were not a pack of castrator bull dykes baying for the blood of men in the manner of modern feminazis. Most married after the war and led perfectly normal lives with husbands, children and all the rest. The regiment enjoyed good relations with all-male neighboring air regiments. The front-line ground troops universally adored the Night Witches as well. Their skill and responsiveness as a fighting force assured this. The Night Witches were friendly folk. But there was a clear line. The regiment was a sisterhood. No boys allowed.

Nor was there any effort made to masculinize the women of the regiment. “We are not pseudo-male soldiers” could have been the Night Witches’ unofficial motto. From the hand-embroidered footcloths to the cute kitten mascots to the free crying at the loss of comrades and friends, the femininity was unmistakable and proudly displayed. The Night Witches were women. They were proud to be women. And they had no desire whatsoever to imitate men. They would get the job done, but they would do it their way, not the men’s way.

The system paid off. Women transferring in from integrated air regiments would immediately remark on how much easier it was to serve in the Night Witches, though they performed the same work and often more work than they had before. The Night Witches maintained a sortie rate nearly double of the average night bomber regiment. The regiment had created an environment of remarkable efficiency and incredible unit cohesion. As result, it could work wonders.

In comparison, integrated regiments had incessant problems. The 587th Bomber Regiment can serve as a good example. Though originally envisioned as an all-female unit, the regiment was unable to maintain an all-female composition. The culprit was the regiment’s Pe-2 dive bomber, a very high-performance aircraft with a crew of three. When training began, the women of the regiment quickly discovered that the airplane had been built with men in mind, and big, strong men at that. The seats were too big. In order to reach the control pedals on the floor, the pilots had to stuff several folded pillows between their backs and the back of the seat. The controls were entirely cable-actuated. So stiff were they that, when taking off with a full bomb load, the pilot would have to yank the stick with all her strength and the navigator would have to push on the pilot as hard as she could, just to get the plane airborne. But the tail gunner’s machinegun was the worst. In order to reload this miracle of Soviet ergonomics, the gunner had to exert a 60-kilo (132 lb!) pull with the left hand. There were only two women in the entire regiment who could accomplish this feat, and one of them could only do it in the air, presumably with the airplane in a shallow dive. When all was said and done, men were brought in to do the things women physically could not and the regiment ended up with female pilots, female navigators, male tail gunners and mixed ground crew. The men and women were at daggers drawn for the rest of the war. So bad did things get that, when a pilot decided to invent a “mechanical problem” in order to drop back from formation for a moment and drop a homemade regimental brag streamer onto a liberated town, the gunner went and ratted out his pilot, earning her 15 days in the slammer. Having a male commander over female pilots did not help matters either.

These kinds of problems were typical. The 586th Fighter Regiment had the worst problems of all. After much pain and suffering, a workable solution was finally discovered. The women pilots ended up in two squadrons under female commanders, while the male pilots were consolidated into a third squadron under a male commander. The ground crew remained mixed. The fact that none of the female members of the 586th ever mention the male squadron in their memoirs speaks for itself.

Now, since we are talking about Jewish forces, let’s talk about Halacha. Halacha is absolutely clear. Women CANNOT serve in mixed units. We can argue about what does and does not constitute kli gever. In the opinion of this author, anyone who extends the Talmudic prohibition on swords into a blanket prohibition on firearms is, at best, ignorant of the nature of firearms. Similarly, anyone who insists that women cannot wear pants needs to go walk down the street and see how many men wear hot pink jeans. But the idea that tziniut and shomer negia can be preserved with men and women sleeping side by side in the same tents, with male NCOs in charge of female soldiers and vice versa and with the stress of combat as aphrodisiac is laughable on the face of it.

However, none of this precludes women from serving in an armed force! In fact, what we see once again is proof of the wisdom of our Sages. The best way to integrate women into a fighting force is to place them into separate units, with female NCOs, female officers, female commanders and not a man in sight! As a male unit is a rough brotherhood with all the attendant behaviors thereof, so a female unit must be a mutually-supportive SISTERHOOD, an entity completely different in character, though no less efficient and no less resilient. To attempt anything else, be it politically correct gender mixing or some kind of nonsensical pseudo-masculine parody, is to court disaster.

Physical limitations further dictate that female units should not be armed with weapons that are too heavy for the average woman to handle. This dovetails nicely with the value of female lives. Women should be protected at all costs. Therefore, they are by default relegated to support and defensive roles. They fight only as a last resort.

Armed with this understanding of the role of women in combat, we can now discuss the composition of the Local Force Battalion in some detail.

First in readiness and quality among the battalion’s units is the Strike Platoon. The guerillas equip this unit with their best weaponry and pack it with their best men. In towns and villages not under complete guerilla control, this unit often masquerades as the local police or volunteer security force. It trains constantly and often openly, in keeping with its “police” mission. Often, the occupier can be tricked into supplying all or most of this unit’s equipment and weapons. For example, the British Mandate supplied the so-called Jewish Settlement Police.

The Strike Platoon is led by the most experienced senior lieutenant in the battalion, and may even be led by a captain. The platoon commander works directly for the battalion commander. His is the first unit of the battalion to engage any invader and the unit of the battalion most likely to engage in offensive operations.

In addition to the usual three squads and a headquarters, the Strike Platoon is often heavily reinforced with additional well-armed cells. In conditions similar to those obtaining currently in the Holy Land it may even be a fully motorized force with armored vehicles and numerous heavy weapons.

The members of the Strike Platoon are the only full-time fighters in the Local Force battalion. At least one squad of them is constantly on alert, ready to respond to emergencies within the stronghold or within the immediate area around it. When not training or resting, members engage in operational activities in the local area in order to clear it of hazards and improve guerilla control over the zone around the stronghold.

The Strike Platoon is the primary training ground for future guerilla leaders, as well as for young guerillas looking for a chance to advance into the Regional Force and hence the Field Force. Whether it operates openly as the local strong arm of the guerilla army, or semi-covertly under the excuse of “policing” or stealthily by night; the Strike Platoon strikes terror into the guerillas’ local enemies and presents a deterrent to the occupier.

The Strike Platoon is composed of skilled, aggressive men aged generally 18 – 30. The commander, more often than not, is an experienced officer seconded from the Regional Force or even the Field Force. If he is a captain, it is not inconceivable that he is fourth or even third in line to command the battalion in the event of casualties.

Next in readiness among the battalion’s forces is the Field Company. The Field Company is composed of the stronghold’s able-bodied men, aged 18 through around 40. In terms of organization, it is a standard guerilla company with three platoons and a company headquarters. The presence or absence of additional reinforcing assets depends on the availability of funds and equipment. Generally these are absent.

The mission of the Field Company is to provide the main fighting force of the battalion. When the Strike Platoon is insufficient for offensive operations or is unavailable for some reason (e.g. the need to pose as “legal” “police”), the Field Company is used to provide additional manpower. Examples of company missions would include large-scale raids on enemy population centers, massive simultaneous infrastructure attacks in zone and large-scale attacks against enemy forces travelling through or patrolling in or around the immediate vicinity of the stronghold. The latter take place generally as ambushes. Large enemy elements can be engaged in a company-sized ambush if conditions are favorable. If conditions are not favorable, these take place as multiple, often simultaneous, small ambushes throughout the zone combined with indirect fire attacks with mortars and rockets and large-scale nuisance mining. For example large numbers of IEDs may be deployed simultaneously on all major avenues of approach in zone, causing major headaches for enemy forces. The latter approach is aimed at providing a continuous drumbeat of terror against the enemy, denying him a moment’s rest and presenting him with multiple simultaneous tactical dilemmas. Examples of favorable conditions include conditions which blind enemy sensors, such as dense vegetation, thermal inversion, dense fog and signs of enemy unpreparedness. Unfavorable conditions would include lack of places to hide due to lack of vegetation and/or suitable prepared positions, lack of adequate escape routes due to, for example, an insufficient tunnel network in zone and, of course, responsive air support, indirect fire support, preparedness and heavy armament on the part of the enemy.

Another typical Field Company mission is the security zone. This mission is generally undertaken under cover of darkness. It involves emplacing numerous related ambushes and observation posts throughout a designated area. The observation posts and ambushes cooperate to track enemy elements moving through the security zone. On command or upon some specified condition, these are engaged from several directions simultaneously. When the enemy attempts to retreat or calls for reinforcements, he is presented with serious tactical dilemmas. Ambushes and observation posts which enemy forces had previously walked past without being engaged become active in engaging the enemy with direct and indirect fire, IEDs and other available methods. A properly executed security zone can cause very serous casualties to the enemy. In many cases, enemy forces are too strong for the guerillas to overcome. In this case, the guerillas withdraw via prepared avenues of approach or hide in well-camouflaged bunkers, leaving the enemy to lick his wounds and trip over booby traps in the dark. Sporadic sniping often continues throughout the night. In other cases, the guerillas may destroy small enemy units completely. In either case, the enemy’s dead and wounded are stripped of anything useful whenever it is feasible to do so.

Security zone operations require substantial skill to execute successfully. However, they are extremely useful in extending the area controlled by the stronghold. Those who have found themselves in the middle of an enemy security zone can attest to the fact that, even in the best of circumstances, it is an intensely unpleasant experience. Even if, by some miracle, no one gets killed, the chaos and fatigue of constantly running in circles all night have intense psychological effects. If this goes on night after night for weeks on end, even the most motivated men get seriously worn out.

Eventually, as casualties mount and no tangible result seems to accrue, regular forces who oppose the guerillas tend to withdraw from the area. At first, this withdrawal takes the form of a cessation of night operations. This gives the guerillas freedom of movement throughout the night and facilitates emplacement of ambushes and explosive devices as well as indirect fire attacks against the fortified camps of the enemy. Eventually, the enemy abandons day operations as well and comes to huddle behind walls. Later, as casualties incurred due to indirect fire and attacks on supply convoys mount, enemy camps are abandoned and guerilla control grows.

Field Company operations often result in the capture of enemy prisoners. These can be used for propaganda, prisoner exchanges or any other purpose that serves the guerillas’ cause. If the prisoners are deemed useless, they are executed. A prisoner is always an extra mouth to feed and an escape risk. Guerilla forces always consider carefully whether the taking of prisoners is worthwhile on any given mission. Furthermore, it is quite plain to anyone but the most addled fool that the taking of Moslem prisoners by Jewish guerillas is strictly forbidden. Moslems are Bnei Amalek. To take them prisoner is to violate a major mizvah. Therefore, it is only permissible to do so if Jewish lives will be saved thereby. For example, terms may be offered to a group of Moslems holding a particularly well-fortified position. If Moslems are taken prisoner, it is strictly forbidden to release them in condition to do any further harm to Jews. Therefore, at minimum, Moslem prisoners being released in exchange for some benefit should be crippled in some manner. A traditionally effective measure is to amputate the right hand at the wrist.

Disposal of executed prisoners depends on objectives and circumstances. One might imagine that, in the Holy Land, the corpses of captured Moslems would be used to induce terror in the enemy, while the bodies of Israeli prisoners killed while attempting to escape or executed for serious crimes against the Jewish People would be carefully hidden and later exchanged for Jewish prisoners held by Israel.

Though it is reasonably well trained, the Field Company is not a full-time force. Its members spend most of their time engaged in legitimate activities to provide parnassa for themselves and their families. Nonetheless, they engage in extensive part-time training. Individual and cell-level tasks, such as marksmanship, movement techniques, etc, are trained at least three times a week, if not daily. This training is performed in a “night school” format. Similarly, indoctrination is continuous. In the case of Jews, it would take place during daily Torah study. Collective tasks at squad level and above are trained weekly on a specially selected day, which is devoted entirely or almost entirely to military training.

The next unit in the battalion is the Home Company. As the name implies, this unit’s primary mission is to defend the stronghold. It does not, except under extraordinary circumstances, engage in offensive operations. However, its members are intimately familiar with the ins and outs of the bunkers, tunnels and houses they are expected to defend. In an emergency, every member of the Home Company knows his post. Members of the company are often posted on guard duty around and within the stronghold in order to supplement the Strike Platoon by providing extra eyes, ears and rifle barrels.

In addition, the Home Company has a mission to train and indoctrinate the young men of the community in order to prepare them for service in the Field Company. Finally, members of the Home Company spend a great deal of time teaching military skills to the community’s children, especially its boys, in order to prepare them to enter the Home Company and Second Company with a modicum of basic skills and knowledge.

The Home Company is composed of able-bodied young men aged 13 – 18 and able-bodied older men aged roughly 40 – 60. It trains as often as resources permit. The Home Company is an effective vehicle for the transfer of knowledge between the older generation who form the core of officers and NCOs and the youth who form the body of the company. Paradoxically, though it is third priority when it comes to equipment and supplies, the Home Company often ends up better trained than the Field Company and may even have higher overall morale. The reason for this is that many of its members have more time to train. Youth who go to school inside the stronghold spend much of their time studying military tasks. The school day also tends to end earlier than the work day. On the other hand, older men may be retired or dedicated to full-time teaching. Therefore, they too can often have more time to practice military skills. In addition, they tend to have a wealth of experience to draw upon. Many of them will have seen quite a bit of action, including service in the Regional Force and Field Force, not to mention wars fought as members of a regular army. The younger men of the Field Company may be stronger and healthier, but old age and guile have often managed to defeat youth and strength.

The Home Company operates a youth mentorship program, wherein its younger members are taught skills which they then have to teach, in turn, to those younger than themselves. It is possible to have “shadow” youth cells managed by capable members of the Home Company, wherein an older teenager is given the responsibility to act as a cell leader to two boys who are not old enough to enter the Home Company. Just like a real-world cell leader, he becomes responsible for their training, indoctrination and general welfare. The teenager’s cell leader, in turn, acts as a general supervisor to ensure that the right things happen in the two youth cells. This program builds a sense of responsibility in the young men of the Home Company while simultaneously imparting leadership skills and ingraining military skills. No skill is truly learned until one has learned how to teach the same skill to others.

The Home Company’s major difficulties lie in the nature of its membership. Older men and younger teenagers are not as strong or as fast as full-grown men. This limits the company’s physical capabilities as a unit. Also, while teenage young men do not lack courage, they tend to be unsteady and overly emotional. Thus they are more prone to both sudden panic and sudden fits of rage, both of which can be quite dangerous on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the Home Company, if properly constituted, can be an effective fighting force.

As a side note, the youth-heavy demographics of the Jewish communities situated in Israeli-occupied Medinat Yehudah may cause modifications to the structure of the home company or to the age cutoff between the Home Company and the Field Company. It is not wholly unreasonable to have additional platoons in the Home Company, for example, nor it unreasonable to change the entry age for the Field Company from 18 to 16.

The Second Home Company, also called Second Company, is composed of the community’s able-bodied women, with the exception of those women who are assigned to the battalion’s aid station or other headquarters units, such as a field hospital or command center. The Second Company is, of course, an all-female unit with a female commander. This unit fights only as a last resort, in the immediate defense of the stronghold. Its combat duties generally include augmentation of fixed positions, internal quick reaction force missions, gathering and moving non-combatants (the sick, the children and the elderly) to safety in an emergency, protection of childrens’ bunkers, evacuation of wounded, messenger service, restoration of communications (e.g. re-stringing wire or fiber optic line, replacing destroyed or damaged radio antennae), emergency resupply of units inside the perimeter and reinforcement of key fixed positions as necessary.

Insofar as training and structure, including youth mentorship, the Second Company operates just like the Home Company. The only difference is that the Second Company is an all-girls club that trains separately from the men.

The performance of the Second Company can vary considerably. In some cases, it may only know its chain of command and its duties may be limited to shepherding children to bunkers and guarding the doors. In other cases, it may be a very capable fighting force. For example, it must be noted that women, once they get used to the weight, recoil and noise of a rifle, tend to be better shots than men. It is not improbable that some of the best marksmen in the battalion will actually be markswomen from the Second Company. When placed in key positions in the defense they can cause great damage to the attacking enemy.

While at first glance it may seem that the Second Company must be much bigger than the Home Company and must therefore break the rule of threes by adding extra platoons, this is not necessarily the case. Most of the healthy young women in a proper Jewish town are in some stage of pregnancy most of the time. After the first trimester, pregnancy begins to impose increasingly severe limitations on physical performance. Therefore, many women will not be available as fully capable combatants at any particular moment. It is probable that the leadership of the company will choose to organize into larger, more fluid cells than can cope with such issues without losing effectiveness. It is better to let the women themselves find the solution to these kinds of issues as any solutions invented by men will most probably fail.

In addition to the line companies and the Strike Platoon, the battalion must, of course, have a headquarters. The battalion commander is a lieutenant colonel responsible for everything the unit does and/or fails to do. His executive officer is a major who is second in command, acts as circus master for the staff and generally does whatever the commander is too busy to attend to. Both men have radio operators (generally each has two). There is also a battalion staff and an aid station.

Since the operation of a staff leads naturally into a discussion of the nature and operation of guerilla strongholds, we will address this topic in the next lesson. Before we conclude, we must say a few words about battalion operations at the Local Force level. As should be apparent from the nature of the battalion, it operates as such only in defense of the stronghold it occupies. Most of the work of the battalion staff involves the administration and preparation of the stronghold. Nonetheless, in addition to a straightforward armed defense of the stronghold, there is one more mission that the battalion often executes. This mission is a planned riot. This mission is undertaken when the Local Battalion operates primarily underground or when circumstances dictate that violence be limited. For example, Arab Local Force and Regional Force units are currently engaged in extensive planned riot operations in Akko.

In the early phase of the struggle to liberate Medinat Yehudah, examples of planned riots may include an effort to eliminate IDF presence in a particular area or an effort to stop an IDF invasion/destruction of a yishuv. In a riot, the Field Company is the main effort. Its members undertake the most theatrical and dangerous acts of violence, such as the destruction of enemy vehicles, physical attack on enemy security personnel using clubs and firebombs, toppling of barricades and so forth. Of especial importance are actions taken to prevent the arrest of battalion members and to liberate personnel arrested by enemy security forces. During the riot, Strike Platoon personnel and select members of other companies may be deployed to fire aimed shots at the enemy from concealed positions or from inside the rioting crowd. Home Company and Second Company personnel add numbers and theatrical effect to the operation. Designated members film the action in order to facilitate propaganda and after-action reviews. While the outside observer would see the riot as “spontaneous”, in reality it is merely a battalion defense or battalion attack executed by unusual methods. Like in any other military operation, there is a main effort, supporting efforts, a reserve, logistical support, command and control, etc. It must be noted that a controlled riot can very easily become an uncontrolled one, especially when bona-fide civilians and random “activists” are also involved. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as long as the guerillas involved keep their head and work to accomplish their objectives while the civilians and “activists” run amuck without rhyme or reason. The importance of thorough planning and rehearsal cannot be overemphasized. The same goes for the importance of initiative, flexibility and quick thinking when the riot, inevitably, fails to go according to plan.

In this lesson, we have learned about the organization and structure of guerilla forces. We have learned that guerilla forces have only three enlisted ranks. We have learned that all guerillas start at the bottom and progress upwards, eliminating the “new lieutenant” syndrome that plagues conventional western-pattern forces. We have learned about the structure of the guerilla force, from the three-man cell to the battalion. We have learned how women and youth are incorporated into the Local Force battalion.

As a final note, the reader is cautioned that the guerilla force itself does not arise in its final form all at once. This would require a miracle. Instead, the force grows slowly from individual cells until fully formed battalions and fully formed strongholds emerge. The process starts in one of two ways. Either small communities coalesce behind activist leaders and begin to organize themselves, or small groups of determined men and women begin to arm themselves and undertake guerilla operations. In both cases, the operations are aimed first and foremost at generating publicity and thus creating new recruits. Eventually the force reaches critical mass and achieves a Stage 1 transition. The fully-formed organization described above is unlikely to emerge until Stage 1 is well underway.


9 Responses to “Self-Liberation 101 Lesson 5.3: The Local Force Battalion”

  1. Velvel Says:

    This entry could be a book. It’s going to be a while before I get through all this…. Hope others will read it too.

  2. Vienna Mike Says:

    Indeed, books have been written on this subject. There is just too much information to make these lessons any smaller yet still have them make sense and be useful. Hang in there!

  3. Daniel Says:

    I read this a few times over the last few days- I agree with some parts and disagree with others. First, wouldn’t the right analogy for women fighters in Medinat Yehuda be with the viet-cong’s “long haired army”, who were at least geurillas, rather than with night-bombers in WW2? Admittedly, Jews cannot afford a “long-haired army”- here I agree with you.
    Mainly, this stage you’re talking about is fairly advanced. A prerequisite is economic viability, as I keep repeating. Geurillas in Vietnam were mostly farmers before the war, and could grow crops on the move, or take food in villages. But shut down Beit El for a day or two, and you’ll get serious food shortages.
    Nothing is impossible- but I certainly hope that logistics are properly handled, and that even if Tzahal kills Jews with bullets that we don’t kill ourselves with starvation…
    An essential element, as sk points out, is Rabbis as authority figures. The role of Rabbis in a resistance has to be thought out- Rabbi Uzi Meshulam might make one think.

  4. Vienna Mike Says:

    Daniel, I used the Night Witches because that particular bit of history perfectly illustrates my point and is extensively documented. It also happens to be a time and a place that is near and dear to my heart. I did not grow up listening to stories about the Viet Cong.

    Insofar as rabbis, I believe that their utility is sharply limited. Most rabbis are about as useful as leaders of a revolution as the average English teacher. Today’s rabbis are, for the most part, ivory-tower academics, lawyers and schoolteachers. Those few that have moral courage do not have the ruthlessness necessary to lead a resistance movement. Neither R. Kahane nor R. Meshulam ever fully admitted, even to themselves, what the Israeli state is. Even in extremis, even today, they might have authorized the killing of adults, but never the full gamut of resistance measures necessary in order to achieve victory. They were simply too GOOD. Saints do not, generally, make for good resistance leaders. Rabbis can serve as useful martyrs and they can play significant supporting roles in the political wing of any resistance. Patriotic rabbis will certainly be key to the establishment of a post-liberation Torah Republic. But they will not and should not have control over the armed struggle itself.

    Insofar as self-sufficiency, the key is ALWAYS first and foremost to end Israeli presence within the Jewish cities and towns in Yosh. After that, there are two things to be done. The soil of Yosh must be rehabilitated and the unviable suburbs of Yosh must be turned into true settlements.

    The soil of Yosh has been terribly damaged by millenia of Arab occupation. The vast majority of the territory must be rehabilitated with reclamation plants before it can be of much use for agriculture. I am no agronomist, but I doubt the process can possibly take less than a century. However, the premier reclamation plant for the Holy Land happens to be Jatropha curcas. Within 3 years of planting, the Jatropha bush is 2-3 meters tall and bears fruit whose seeds are essentially full of biodiesel waiting to be pressed out. You kill 3 birds with one stone — reclaim the soil, cover the land with a thick jungle of brush able to conceal an infantryman or a tunnel entrance and get a means to make fuel and thus money. The key is to plant these in expanding zones and guard them to prevent the Israelis and their Moslem allies from destroying them. This implies wide-scale use of IEDs, mines and snipers, as well as aggressive raiding and rioting. When there is serious Jewish resistance in the Holy Land, you will be able to recognize an established Stage 2 no-go area by the Jatropha jungle crowding the road on both sides.

    Insofar as settlements, these must have proper defenses and be self-sufficient in food production. The latter is not as impossible as it sounds. The problem of growing a lot of food in a compact area has been extensively researched. We have come a long way from the WWII “victory garden”. With modern methods, it takes about 2500 square feet of double-dug French Bed to feed a man for a year at 2900 vegan calories per day, with complete nutrition in protein, fats and carbohydrates as well as vitamins. This sounds strange until you realize that a 50/50 mix of wheat and amaranth, for example, has slightly better nutrition than beef when properly cooked. The Jew of Yosh will eat a lot of amaranth and quinoa with his wheat and corn, and lots of vegetables. Meat will be a rarity reserved for Shabbat and the hagim. But 2900 calories a day are more than enough for both combat and back-breaking physical labor. Cultivating French Bed is a full-time job, but it pays off. In order to produce surpluses and store food for the decisive part of the struggle, the Jews would have to cultivate about 5000 square feet of French Bed per person. Alternatively, one can create a containerized garden with the same cultivated area. Basically all this is is French Bed in a box. These are often called “new method square foot gardens”. This is doable. With overhead (propagation areas, mulching areas, paths) the total garden area is a 30m X 30m box per person. That’s the size of a large lawn. It is also possible that many Jewish towns will use aquaculture. A lot of water in Yosh is brackish. You have to build purification systems if you are going to use it to irrigate crops (thankfully the sun is free). But fish and water weeds don’t mind brackish water at all, if you pick the right species. Again, I am no specialist in these matters, but decades of experience by NGOs in the third world and by organic farmers in the first world shows that these systems are effective and reliable means of food production.

    The key is to build the infrastructure to support this (the beds themselves, wells, solar power dishes, composting toilets, water recycling systems, food preservation and storage facilities…) and prevent the Israelis and the Moslems from destroying it by expelling the enemy and keeping him away from the Jewish cities and towns.

    The key to everything is SECURITY and ORGANIZATION. You will be able to easily recognize a true Jewish settlement at a glance — the antitank ditches, berms, wire, towers on the outside, the sharp-eyed guards on the perimeter, the unpleasant feeling of being watched by unseen eyes looking through scopes long before you get near it… As you get closer you might see the firing slits of some of the bunkers of the perimeter works, and wonder about the well-camouflaged ones you didn’t see, both on the perimeter and outside it. On the inside the place will also be instantly recognizable: the composting toilets instead of flush toilets, the strict recycling and waste composting system, the complete absence of useless lawns, every square centimeter of open area devoted to gardens, squat, flat-roofed reinforced concrete buildings with narrow windows and armored steel shutters, parapetted roofs covered in container gardens and trellises to conceal any defender moving about on the roof behind a veil of plants both on the sides and above… It will look like a SETTLEMENT, not a stupid suburb with red tile roofs and paper caravillas.

    Vienna Mike will not give a penny to rebuild the Federman farm so it can be destroyed again. But to turn Kiryat Arba or Tapuach into a settlement, now THAT is a cause worth donating money to.

  5. Rob Says:

    Mike, question. You know as well as anyone the scutiny as well as the pressures which the state of Israel is under from ther US, the EU. in consideration of this, do you actually believe they would sit idle while this resistance took place?

    Also, would you not agree that the establishment of the modern state of Israel was a fulfillment of prophecy? How can one reconcile more than a struggle against it if it is in fact a result of such, would this not make it holy?

    I read in the bible, book of the prophet Joel I think,my apologies, I’m no scholar, that Hashem said, If My people, called by My name should humble themselves before me, and turn from their ways, I Hashem, will hear them and restore them, I know I did not recite this verbatem, apologies. is it not possible for any tragically horrible event to cause such a repentance among the “israelis”, so called?

    Thanks in advance, Rob

  6. Vienna Mike Says:

    Yes, Rob, the goyim will do everything in their power to sabotage Jewish self-defense. The goyim will do everything they can, within reason, to prevent the emergence of a Jewish State and to destroy it if it does emerge. They are goyim. It is their nature.

    However, the means at their disposal are limited. They can seek to cut off funding from abroad. They can unleash a torrent of antisemitic propaganda. They can use Israelis and Moslems to attack the Jews. Finally, they can use their armed forces and invade.

    First, let’s talk about funds from abroad. Charities and legitimate businesses are difficult to stop. The law enforcement agencies of Europe and America have had little effect on fundraising by Islamists or Irishmen or Tamils or Armenians or anyone else who has a large diaspora to call on. They will likewise have limited success with Jewish charities whose stated goal is to feed the hungry in the Holy Land. The charities will certainly feed the hungry and provide them with funds. Where the hungry are located and what they do with the funds after these have been provided is no fault of the charity. Or so you can easily argue in court, if you have a good lawyer. America, at least, is still a country of laws. Even Europe is not too far gone.

    Another thing to consider regarding funds is that, as resistance escalates and Jews turn their suburbs into settlements, they will become increasingly self-sufficient. This means that less and less money will be spent on food and more and more will be spent on weapons and raw materials needed to make weapons. Here again, things are difficult to stop. We are not a bunch of uneducated third world peasants. We have education and skills. It is relatively simple to stop the importation of, say, antitank missiles. But how do you stop the importation of laser pointers and electronics and pvc pipe? Yet give me some time, some electronics, some pvc pipe, a good laser pointer, some common chemicals and a copper funnel and I can build you a laser-guided ATGM. It won’t be anywhere near as good as one made by KBP or Rafael, but it will be functional enough for guerilla purposes.

    Insofar as goyshe propaganda, what does it matter if we are hated more than we are hated already? So they want to kill us. So what else is new? Why should we care about their opinion?

    Finally, we can talk about the force option. Against this option, the main defense is deterrence based on a track record of success. The Israelis and the Moslems will be put off by well-built defenses and prompt, brutal retaliation. Yes, the IDF will be able to crush any settlement. But at what cost? Today it costs nothing to demolish a Jewish home. If tomorrow it costs the lives of ten or twenty soldiers, plus a few hundred Israeli civilians killed in retaliatory attacks, will the Israelis so cavalierly throw Jewish children out of windows at 3 am? And if the day after tomorrow the costs rise to several hundred dead Israeli soldiers and a brigade operation with armor, artillery and air support, with a half-dozen tanks and twice that many APCs destroyed even before the Jews drop a couple of hundred rockets on north Tel Aviv, will the Israelis still pay the price? And if the resistance is fierce and effective, what European or American government will commit its troops to fighting it? Raise the potential price far enough, and the option will not even be on the table.

    I hate to quote Khomeini, but America can’t do a damned thing. And neither can Europe. These guys are paper tigers. Hashem is on the side of the righteous.

    Now, regarding the miracles of Israel’s creation. The mouth of Bilaam’s donkey miraculously spoke. It was, Pirkei Avot tells us, a special and miraculous creation. Does that mean that the mouth was holy? Does that mean that the donkey was holy? When Bilaam ment to curse the Jews but miraculously ended up blessing them, was Bilaam made holy thereby?

    The miracles of Israel’s creation are a red herring. Hashem made miracles in order to create the dati leumi. Sadly, after 2000 years of exile, the Jews were sunk deep into iniquity and herecy. The disgusting pacifism, misinterpretation of the Three Oaths and reliance on miracles could not help but lead to punishment after terrible punishment. In His infinite mercy, Hashem used the only Jews still willing to act according to rational plans instead of depending on miracles. He used the godless Zionist communists. Such is His great wisdom and power, that even the wicked do His bidding.

    Medinat Yehudah may merit to be holy, if we pray hard enough and work hard enough at making it pure, at not relying on miracles and at purging ourselves of the illnesses of galut. But Medinat Israel will never be holy. It bears the same relation to holiness that a pile of manure bears to a tree that it fertilizes. The fertilizer is merely the means. Once composted and used properly, it can enable the tree to sprout from a tiny seed and grow to be a mighty oak. But the manure is not the tree. It is a filthy, smelly fertilizer that is used only insofar as it is useful and, ultimately, is consumed and destroyed in order to grow the tree.

    Finally, I will address the possibility of mass repentance on the part of the Israelis. While such a miracle is possible, it is just that, a miracle. We can pray to Hashem for such an outcome. But we cannot rely on miracles.

  7. Daniel Says:

    I’m not sure I agree with the Jatropha idea, even though you seem to like it- The Israelis know very well how to defoliate and knock out plants without exposing themselves, assuming it would be any use anyway. I also don’t agree with the vision for a settlement, even though I agree that a silly suburb is the wrong way to go. My disagreement is that the most deadly place looks completely normal. You want the security to be invisible.
    You’re right that the food issue can be solved- but it requires education. I.e. Jews in Yesha have to learn to work the land, and have to learn techniques such as the one you mention. Moreover, they have to want to grow their own food. Talking about Beit El, my point was psychological- maybe these people can grow their own food if they really put their minds to it, but they’re a long way from that now… then again, that’s true for the whole resistance.
    I don’t know… things seem really hopeless. Because the people are such jackasses. And the “right wing”, who should be with us, have some of the biggest jackasses of all, too obsessed with little perks to think more then 2 weeks into the future (not to mention their idiotic aliyah obsession). I think if the people of Israel had the stoic determination of the people of Vietnam then your plan would be viable. As it is, you’ve got a nation of chumps. And I can’t see any sign of that changing.

  8. Daniel Says:

    Rob- I actually think the Goyim will hate us less if we resist. The governments will make noises, but the people will respect us. Same way we respect the Vietnamese resisting the Americans… and in a strange way we even respect Hizbullah for resisting Tzahal…

  9. Vienna Mike Says:

    Daniel, I do not claim that the Jatropha idea is a panacea. Defoliants and napalm work quite effectively. But again the issue is deterrence. How many Israeli lives is a bush worth? What if there were a price to be paid in lives for every destroyed bush? Yet if they do not destroy the bushes, the Jews have concealment… Periodically, of course, they will destroy anyway. Periodically they will level settlements and slaughter the inhabitants with air attack and artillery bombardment. But it is not easy to destroy tunnel networks. And if they are made to pay, they will stop. Let me be blunt. The Israelis cannot stop an enemy who can look like them, talk like them and act like them. An Arab suicide bomber can be stopped because you can profile Arabs. Arabs are a minority. In many places they are a rarity. But you cannot profile a Jewish suicide bomber. All a Jew has to do is shave and put on goyish clothes. He instantly becomes indistinguishable from an Israeli. Resistance can only be successful if it is more ruthless and more brutal than anything Hamas has ever dreamt of. If the Jews are unwilling to employ every method employed by Hamas but on a greater scale and with greater skill, the Jews have no chance.

    Alas, you are correct about the “right”. Which is why I am writing blogs in the galut. This blog exists to educate. Whether it will reach more than one or two people I do not know. But I will have at least tried.

    P.S. You are right that the deadliest settlement would look as normal as possible. However, I believe that deterrence would work better than deception. I would rather spare lives, both Jewish and Israeli, by making the Jewish settlements look like fortresses. Perhaps I am wrong. The Viet Cong certainly tended to make their settlements look “normal”. Then again, the Viet Cong did not have the capacity to kill hunderds of Americans by daily blowing up buses in Washington D.C.

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